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INTRODUCTION 
“The free man is the private man . . . .”1 
More than a century ago, two scholars2 sparked a debate that will 
probably never end:  whether individuals possess a right to privacy and, 
if so, the nature and extent to which the law should protect privacy 
rights.3  Since that first argument, the debate has ranged—and 
escalated—from whether such a “right ‘to be let alone’”4 truly exists,5 to 
when and under what circumstances a person’s privacy rights are 
violated.6  The debate seems to crescendo with the introduction of new 
technologies.7  The push for global adoption of electronic product code 
(EPC) tags as replacements for universal product code (UPC) bar codes 
sparked one of the more recent debates.8  The chief concern of privacy 
 
 1. Clinton Rossiter, The Pattern of Liberty, in ASPECTS OF LIBERTY:  ESSAYS 
PRESENTED TO ROBERT E. CUSHMAN 15, 17 (Milton R. Konvitz & Clinton Rossiter eds., 
1958). 
 2. I refer, of course, to Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis and their seminal 
Harvard Law Review article on individuals’ privacy rights.  See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. 
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 3. Id. at 197. 
 4. Id. at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR 
THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (Alexis C. Angell ed., 2d ed., 
Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888)). 
 5. Compare id. at 214 (asserting that rules for limiting and remedying the right to 
privacy may be found in “legal analogies already developed in the [common] law of slander 
and libel and in the [common] law of literary and artistic property”), with Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 374 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (“No general right [to privacy] is 
created by the [Fourth] Amendment . . . .”), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–
86 (1965) (asserting there is a “right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights,” and even 
though not enumerated, “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance” and “create zones 
of privacy”). 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (stating, in dicta, that a dog 
sniff of a person’s luggage for illicit drugs does “not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment,” and, by extension, does not constitute a privacy violation 
because “this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search”).  But see 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where . . . the Government uses a device that 
is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment 
‘search’ and is [a] presumptively unreasonable [violation of privacy] without a warrant.”). 
 7. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 304 (1967) (recalling that when 
the U.S. National Office of Vital Statistics proposed replacing social security numbers with 
national birth certificate numbers, the “idea was denounced . . . as a potentially regimenting 
‘police state’ measure, and angry cartoons raised the ‘Big Brother’ argument,” causing 
enough opposition to kill the idea). 
 8. EPC tags are radio frequency identification (RFID) enabled microchips with enough 
memory capacity to store an electronic product code (EPC).  See RFID Technology:  What 
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advocates appears to be that EPC tags would permit individuals to be 
surreptitiously profiled and tracked.9  Just like earlier debates involving 
technology and privacy, the war of words over the planned 
implementation of EPC tags has become quite robust.  In addition, the 
possible use of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology in 
certain government-issued identification cards—for example, drivers’ 
licenses, student identification cards, and government health and benefit 
cards—has received considerable attention.10 
By contrast, an issue that has received little, if any, attention from 
privacy advocates is the use of RFID technology in contactless payment 
devices such as MasterCard’s PayPass card, Chase Card Service’s 
(Chase) blink card, or ExxonMobil’s Speedpass key fob.11  The 
 
the Future Holds for Commerce, Security, and the Consumer:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 108th Cong. 10 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] 
(prepared statement of Sanjay Sarma, Assoc. Professor, Mass. Inst. Tech.).  EPCs are 
identification numbers of sufficient length to allow for trillions of unique numbers—enough 
to assign a unique EPC to all items produced worldwide.  Id. at 10–13; see also Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse (PRC), RFID Position Statement of Consumer Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Organizations (Nov. 20, 2003), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/RFIDposition.htm 
[hereinafter RFID Position Statement]. 
 9. See, e.g., KLAUS FINKENZELLER, RFID HANDBOOK:  FUNDAMENTALS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN CONTACTLESS SMART CARDS AND IDENTIFICATION 1 (Rachel 
Waddington trans., 2d ed., John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 2003) (1999). 
 10. See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Fact Sheet:  Senate Bill 768 
(Simitian), http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/RFID/sb682_fact_sheet.php (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2006) (rallying support for California’s proposed Identity Information Protection 
Act of 2006); see also Identity Information Protection Act:  Hearing on S.B. 682 Before the S. 
Judiciary Comm., 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2005), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/ 
pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb_682_cfa_20050518_122757_sen_comm.html; Lee Tien, 
Senior Staff Att’y, EFF, Prepared Testimony Before the S. Judiciary Comm. in Support of 
the Identify Information Protection Act (S.B. 682) (Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.eff.org 
/Privacy/Surveillance/RFID/tien_testimony_sb_682.pdf. 
 11. Although contactless payment proponents assert that contactless payment devices 
and RFID are “fundamentally different,” contactless payment devices operate on chip-level 
radio frequency technology just like all other RFID-enabled devices and are only “different” 
from other RFID-enabled devices in the sense that contactless payment devices have added 
“smart chip technology.”  SMART CARD ALLIANCE, THE WHAT, WHO AND WHY OF 
CONTACTLESS PAYMENTS 2–4, 6 (2006), http://www.smartcardalliance.org/resources/pdf/ 
CP_What_Who_Why_Final.pdf [hereinafter SMART CARD ALLIANCE WHITE PAPER].  In 
other words, the only difference is that in addition to containing an RFID transponder, 
contactless payment devices contain a microcontroller capable of executing a cryptographic 
operation designed to create a unique transaction validation number for every transaction.  
See David Birch, Contactless Payments and the Security Challenges, ITADVISER, July/Aug. 
2005, http://www.nccmembership.co.uk/pooled/articles/BF_WEBART/view.asp?Q=BF_WEB 
ART_171100.  Mark Baard of Wired News provides a more frank assessment of the 
difference: 
[T]he Homeland Security Department is very carefully avoiding use of the term 
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“contactless smart chips”12 powering these contactless payment devices 
can be embedded in countless form factors such as mobile phones, 
wristwatches, or money clips,13 all for the purpose of replacing 
customers’ traditional credit and debit card plastics with magnetic 
stripes.  Such wearable or pocketable form factors may soon be 
supplanted by the next generation of contactless payment devices:  
contactless smart chips implanted subdermally in humans.14  While the 
purported technological limitations and security features of the types of 
RFID-enabled smart chips used in contactless payment devices may 
appear to mitigate security concerns,15 the privacy concerns caused by 
contactless payment devices in any form factor appear to have been 
overlooked.  Such a discussion should not be delayed until, for example, 
contactless payment systems experience “function creep” to be used for 
other purposes.  What if, for example, contactless payment devices 
become so widely distributed that the government realizes it can profile 
 
“RFID.”  The department, along with Philips, is also backing a trade group that is 
branding ID documents with RFID tags as “contactless smartcards.” 
 “We’d prefer,” said Joseph Broghamer, Homeland Security’s director of 
authentication technologies, “that the terms ‘RFID,’ or even ‘RF,’ not be used at 
all . . . [when referring to contactless devices].  Let’s get ‘RF’ out of it altogether.” 
Mark Baard, RFID Cards Get Spin Treatment, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 29, 2005, 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,67025,00.html.  
 12. A contactless smart chip is “[a]n integrated circuit (IC) that includes a secure 
microcontroller or equivalent intelligence and internal memory, and communicates with a 
reader through a radio frequency (RF) interface.”  Smart Card Alliance, Contactless 
Payments Glossary 1, http://www.smartcardalliance.org/resources/pdf/contactless_pmt_ 
glossary.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Glossary]. 
 13. See Evan Schuman, MasterCard Pursues No-Touch Retail, EWEEK, Oct. 9, 2005, 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1868307,00.asp?kc=EWRSS03119TX1K0000594 
[hereinafter Schuman, No-Touch Retail]; see also David Enrich, Money Clips, Jewelry May 
Act as Substitutes for Credit Cards, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2005, at D3. 
 14. The VeriChip, a subdermally-implantable active contactless smart chip introduced 
by Applied Digital Solutions, Inc. (Applied Digital), features a financial services application 
enabling it to be used for contactless payments.  Applied Digital announced its VeriPay 
contactless payment system based on the VeriChip in November 2003.  See Press Release, 
Applied Digital Solutions, Applied Digital Solutions’ CEO Announces “VeriPay” Secure, 
Subdermal Solution for Payment and Credit Transactions at ID World 2003 in Paris (Nov. 21, 
2003), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20031207111617/http://www.adsx.com/news/ 
2003/112103.html.  “VeriPay is intended to be a secure, subdermal RFID . . . payment 
technology for cash and credit transactions.”  Id.  VeriPay is being tested at the Baja Beach 
Club in Barcelona, Spain, where patrons injected with a VeriChip pay for drinks and other 
such things with the wave of a hand.  See Press Release, VeriChip, Applications Continue to 
Grow for Applied Digital Solutions’ VeriPay Baja Beach Club in Barcelona, Spain Employs 
RFID Technology for Cashless Payment System (Apr. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.verichipcorp.com/news/1081144800. 
 15. See infra notes 34–39, 68–69 and accompanying text. 
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and track individuals through their contactless payment devices rather 
than battle public opposition to RFID-enabled identification cards 
under the Real ID Act?16  What if the public so opposes EPC tags as 
UPC bar code replacements in consumer products that businesses have 
to scrap the idea, but businesses then realize they can profile and track 
individuals for marketing purposes just the same by interrogating 
contactless payment devices?  Ultimately, it does not matter whether 
RFID-enabled smart chips are used in identification cards, whether 
EPC tags are ever adopted as UPC bar code replacements in consumer 
products, or whether banks and merchants ever issue subdermal 
contactless payment devices; contactless payment devices already 
provide a reliable infrastructure for profiling and tracking individuals. 
EPC-tagged consumer products are likely years away from being 
ubiquitous and no RFID-enabled identification cards have been issued 
to civilians in the United States.  In contrast, more than eight million 
Americans already carry and use contactless payment devices.17  
Although EPC-tagged consumer products and RFID-enabled, 
government-issued identification cards may be years away from 
providing the beginnings of a surveillance infrastructure, contactless 
payment devices are quietly and quickly creating a surveillance 
infrastructure today.  Contactless payment systems provide a more 
reliable infrastructure for tracking and profiling individuals than would 
EPC-tagged consumer products because many product purchases are 
not for the purchaser’s own consumption.  Individuals often purchase 
consumer products as gifts for others, thus any attempt to profile or 
track the purchaser using EPC tags in those products would be an 
exercise in futility.  Similarly, individuals frequently discard broken or 
worn-out products and dispose of unwanted products—a reality that 
would limit opportunities to profile or track the purchaser and, at a 
minimum, render the collected data questionable since no one would 
know if or when the purchaser discarded or disposed of any particular 
product.  In contrast, a contactless payment device issued to a particular 
individual is highly likely to be carried by that individual nearly 
everywhere he or she goes, never given as a gift or otherwise 
permanently transferred to another person, and never intentionally 
discarded.  While contactless payment systems may create the optimal 
 
 16. Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).  Title II of the Act deals with improved security 
for drivers’ licenses and personal identification cards.  Id. 
 17. See infra notes 52, 70. 
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surveillance infrastructure, privacy advocates and lawmakers appear not 
to have noticed.18 
Part I briefly describes what RFID is and how it works and explains 
why contactless payment systems are likely to provide the best solution 
to accomplish the goals of banks and merchants to achieve 
‘“convenience, speed and ease of use to consumers’” and increase 
profitability as a result of ‘“faster transaction times and increased 
spending per transaction.’”19  Part II briefly describes privacy advocates’ 
focus on the privacy problems caused by every RFID application except 
contactless payment systems, discusses the privacy problems caused by 
contactless payment systems, and reveals the resulting hole in the 
privacy debate.  Part III argues that the proposals for self-regulation or 
legislation that have been developed by privacy advocates and RFID 
proponents fail to address the privacy concerns implicated by 
contactless payment systems.  The Article concludes with a proposed 
legislative response sufficient to address privacy concerns without 
stifling technological development. 
I.  BANKS, MERCHANTS, AND CONSUMERS:  PRIMED FOR 
CONTACTLESS PAYMENT TECHNOLOGY 
A. RFID in a Contactless Payment System Nutshell 
In the context of a contactless payment system, RFID is the system 
for transmitting all of the details of a payment transaction between a 
merchant and the issuer of a contactless payment device.  Stripped of 
technical details, a typical contactless payment transaction flows 
according to the following progressive steps.  At the checkout register, 
the customer briefly holds his or her contactless payment device near 
the merchant’s point-of-sale terminal (POS terminal), which houses an 
RFID reader that “connects to, provides power to and communicates 
with” the contactless payment device.20  The reader interrogates the 
contactless payment device, receives the device’s EPC and a 
 
 18. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 19. Press Release, Market Wire, New Smart Card Alliance Council Created to Inform 
Issuers, Merchants and Consumers About Benefits of Contactless Payments (Aug. 30, 2005) 
(quoting Randy Vanderhoof, Executive Dir., Smart Card Alliance), available at 
http://press.arrivenet.com/technology/article.php/687018.html. 
 20. Glossary, supra note 12, at 2.  RFID readers only need to provide power to 
contactless payment devices employing passive RFID, as passive RFID devices do not have 
their own power source.  See infra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
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cryptogram21 for that transaction, and transmits the transaction details to 
the merchant’s acquiring bank.22  The acquiring bank, in turn, transmits 
the transaction data to the issuing bank.23  The issuing bank uses the 
contactless payment device’s EPC to identify the correct customer’s 
account and uses the cryptogram to confirm the device’s validity.24  The 
issuing bank then returns an authorization, decline, or other appropriate 
response, and the customer goes on his or her way. 
A contactless payment system’s operation depends primarily on two 
RFID components:  an RFID reader housed in a POS terminal, as 
described above; and a “contactless smart chip”—a “secure 
microcontroller or equivalent intelligence, internal memory, and a small 
antenna,” which “communicates with a reader through a contactless 
 
 21. The cryptogram is a one-time code calculated inside the contactless payment device 
that serves as a unique validator for the instant transaction.  The cryptogram is comprised of 
the device’s EPC plus a transaction counter encrypted by a security key inserted in the 
contactless payment device during manufacturing.  This security key is derived from the 
device’s EPC and the issuing bank’s master key.  Once inserted into the contactless payment 
device, the security key is never divulged.  According to one source: 
This kind of solution provides:  Privacy, because the [contactless payment device’s 
unique] ID is meaningless to anyone other than the issuing bank which can map that 
ID to an actual account or card number; [and] Security, because knowing 
the . . . [contactless payment device’s] ID is insufficient to create a cloned . . . 
[contactless payment device].  Also, a cloned . . . [contactless payment device] would 
not generate a correct cryptogram because it would not have the right security key[,] 
and if the transaction is replayed[,] the transaction counter will be wrong. 
Birch, supra note 11.  Birch’s assertion that contactless payment devices provide failsafe 
privacy does not acknowledge the problem of identity theft.  Even if none of an individual’s 
nonpublic personal information is ever stored on a contactless payment device, the device’s 
unique EPC is very meaningful to an identity thief who has other means to gain nonpublic 
personal information about his victim.  See infra notes 65–95 and accompanying text.  
Moreover, the victim’s credit, debit, or other account number and other personal information 
may not be encrypted.  See infra note 74 and accompanying text.  Identity theft is a massive 
problem:  the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received reports of 255,565 cases of identity 
theft in 2005.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT 
REPORT DATA 4 (2006), available at http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/Top10Fraud 
2005.pdf. 
 22. Birch, supra note 11. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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radio frequency (RF) interface.”25  These microchips used in contactless 
payment devices feature either “passive” or “active” RFID.26 
Contactless payment devices that employ passive RFID smart chips 
have no onboard battery, a feature that makes their life span virtually 
unlimited and their design compact.27  Because they have no internal 
power source, they do not continuously transmit data, but rather “wake 
up” to respond to a radio signal from any RFID reader.28  Generally, 
passive smart chips are read-only, meaning the data they contain cannot 
be altered or written over.29  Privacy advocates have focused their 
attention almost exclusively on the type of passive microchips used in 
EPC tags to replace UPC bar codes30 rather than on the passive smart 
chips used in most contactless payment devices.31 
The privacy concerns over the passive microchips in EPC tags seem 
to stem from four factors.  First, the tiny size of the passive microchips 
used in EPC tags could make them difficult, if not impossible, to locate 
once embedded in an object.32  Currently, “the smallest . . . [passive 
microchips] measure[] 0.15 mm × 0.15 mm, and are thinner than a sheet 
of paper.”33  In contrast, the passive smart chips used in some contactless 
payment devices may be as large as a one-inch-long glass or plastic 
 
 25. SMART CARD ALLIANCE, CONTACTLESS SMART CHIP TECHNOLOGY:  THE 
BUSINESS BENEFITS 1 (2005), http://www.smartcardalliance.org/resources/pdf/contactless_ 
business_benefits.pdf.  Because of their “secure microcontroller or equivalent intelligence,” 
proponents of contactless payment devices have dubbed these microchips as “smart chips.”  
Id. 
 26. See RFID 101:  About RFID Tags & Transponders for Radio Frequency 
Identification, http://www.rfid-101.com/rfid-tags.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2006) [hereinafter 
RFID 101]. 
 27. See Stephen C. Bono et al., Security Analysis of a Cryptographically-Enabled RFID 
Device, Refereed Paper at 14th USENIX Security Symposium (Aug. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.usenix.org/events/sec05/tech/bono/bono.pdf. 
 28. RFID 101, supra note 26. 
 29. Birch, supra note 11. 
 30. See generally RFID Position Statement, supra note 8. 
 31. See discussion and notes infra Parts II, II.A.  Not all contactless payment devices 
employ passive RFID; some use low-frequency, active RFID technology.  See infra note 100 
and accompanying text. 
 32. See Oleg Kobelev, Recent Development, Big Brother on a Tiny Chip:  Ushering in 
the Age of Global Surveillance Through the Use of Radio Frequency Identification Technology 
and the Need for Legislative Response, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 325, 331 (2005). 
 33. Wikipedia, Radio Frequency Identification, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RFID (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Wikipedia RFID]; see also Yoshiko Hara, Hitachi 
Advances Paper-Thin RFID Chip, EE TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, http://www.eetimes.com/news/ 
design/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=179100286. 
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capsule.34  Second, since passive microchips of all types have no onboard 
battery, they cannot be turned off35 and are, thus, susceptible to being 
accessed and read by unauthorized RFID readers.  Third, the frequency 
on which RFID-enabled microchips operate dictates their read range.  
The high frequency on which the passive microchips used in EPC tags 
operate could permit an RFID reader to read an EPC tag’s data from 
distances of up to twenty feet.36  In contrast, the passive smart chips used 
in most contactless payment devices operate on a low frequency, which 
contactless payment system proponents claim limits the read range of 
contactless payment devices to no more than four inches.37  Finally, 
while the passive microchips in EPC tags used as UPC bar code 
replacements feature no encryption capability, the passive smart chips 
used in contactless payment devices contain a microcontroller capable 
of executing a complex cryptographic operation, albeit with varying 
levels of encryption,38 to create a unique transaction validation number 
for every transaction.39 
Unlike passive RFID microchips, which have no battery and must be 
interrogated by a reader in order to communicate data, active RFID 
microchips contain a battery-powered transmitter that is constantly on,40 
enabling them to provide information to an RFID reader on demand or 
provide information voluntarily.41  Active microchips are generally 
larger than passive microchips, with the smallest currently ranging in 
 
 34. See, e.g., Bono et al., supra note 27, at 2; see also RFID/EPC Technology Solutions, 
23mm Glass Capsule Transponder DST, http://www.ti.com/rfid/shtml/prod-trans-RI-TRP-
BRHP.shtml (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 35. See Kobelev, supra note 32, at 331. 
 36. RFID 101, supra note 26.  According to the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC), “industry experts say plans for building far more sensitive RFID signal receivers are 
in the works” so this range is likely to increase significantly within the coming years.  EPIC 
RFID Privacy Page, http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 37. Glossary, supra note 12, at 1.  This claim, however, is clearly not true.  See Liz 
Pulliam Weston, New Credit Cards Allow Hands-Free Theft, MSN MONEY, 
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/CreditCardSmarts/NewCreditCardsAllowHan
dsFreeTheft.aspx (last visited Dec. 22, 2006).   
 38. See infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 39. See Geoff MacGillivray, Understanding the Different Memory Types Used in 
Contactless Smart Cards and RFID Tokens, CONTACTLESS NEWS, Oct. 8, 2005, 
http://www.contactlessnews.com/library/2005/10/08/understanding-the-different-memory-
types-used-in-contactless-smart-cards-and-rfid-tokens/. 
 40. RFID 101, supra note 26. 
 41. Tom Kevan, Active RFID Is Redefining Wireless Infrastructure, FRONTLINE 
SOLUTIONS, Oct. 2004, available at http://www.sensitech.com/pdfs/Active_RFID_ 
Redefines.pdf. 
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size from a grain of rice42 to a small coin.43  Active RFID microchips are 
also able to contain much more data than passive microchips, 
“commonly provid[ing] 1 million bits of dynamically searchable data 
storage,”44 and are read-writable, meaning the data they contain can be 
repeatedly written over and changed.45  Although the contactless 
payment devices currently being distributed widely in the United States 
use passive RFID smart chips, it is important to keep in mind that the 
use of active RFID smart chips in contactless payment devices would 
enable those devices to do double duty as both contactless payment 
devices and contactless payment device readers.46 
B.  Why Is Contactless Payment Technology Appealing? 
Proponents of contactless payment systems are sold on—or are 
selling—the idea that contactless payment systems will yield major 
benefits:  faster, more convenient, and more secure payment 
transactions for consumers; and greater profits for banks and 
merchants.47  Banks and merchants tout these speed, convenience, and 
security virtues in their marketing efforts to push contactless payment 
devices into customers’ hands,48 but their real motive appears to be 
 
 42. See VeriChip Corporation, RFID Tags, http://www.verichipcorp.com/content/ 
company/rfidtags (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 43. See Wikipedia RFID, supra note 33. 
 44. Kevan, supra note 41, at 2. 
 45. RFID 101, supra note 26. 
 46. See infra note 100. 
 47. The Smart Card Alliance boasts the membership of hundreds of U.S. and 
international organizations and institutions.  See Smart Card Alliance, Current Members, 
http://www.smartcardalliance.org/about_alliance/current_members.cfm (last visited Dec. 22, 
2006) [hereinafter Smart Card Alliance Current Members].  Alliance members share a 
common mission to “stimulate the understanding, adoption, use and widespread application 
of smart card technology.”  Smart Card Alliance, About the Alliance, 
http://www.smartcardalliance.org/about_alliance/mission.cfm (last visited Dec. 22, 2006).  If 
individual banks and merchants are not already sold on contactless payment system 
technology on their own, they will be soon; Alliance members include MasterCard 
International, Visa USA, and American Express.  See Smart Card Alliance Current 
Members, supra.  In the consumer payment transactions world, as MasterCard and Visa go, 
so goes everyone—this is so because MasterCard and Visa generally require such cooperation 
from banks and merchants in their card acceptance agreements or otherwise create incentives 
too great for banks and, especially, merchants to ignore. 
 48. Claims of faster transaction speeds involve much smoke and mirrors.  The only 
merchants able to shave significant amounts off of transaction processing times are those in 
the quick-serve restaurant category, specifically those with drive-through lanes.  See, e.g., 
Contactless Payments in a ‘blink,’ RFID NEWS, May 23, 2005, http://www.rfidnews.org/news/ 
2005/05/23/contactless-payments-in-a-blink/ (“The most significant timesavings [sic] can be 
realized in the drive-thru environment, where transaction time was reduced by as much as 20 
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greater profits.  Carter Frank, chief marketing officer at Chase 
explained:  “[T]hese innovative [contactless] cards . . . . will provide 
merchants and our cobrand partners with an opportunity to build even 
stronger customer loyalty programs.”49  According to the Smart Card 
Alliance, merchants are especially attracted to contactless payment 
systems because “increased customer loyalty increase[s] revenues.”50  
 
seconds as compared to cash.”).  In reality, payment transaction processing speeds are limited 
by each merchant’s means of routing payment authorization transactions to and from the 
merchant’s acquiring bank.  In the United States, most merchants’ POS terminals dial out on 
regular telephone lines to transmit transaction details and receive the issuing bank’s response.  
It may be a few seconds faster to wave a contactless payment device near an RFID reader 
than to swipe a magnetic stripe on a card, but that has always been the fastest portion of any 
credit or debit card transaction.  Until all merchants implement faster transaction routing 
technology, including use of communication systems such as satellite or “always-on” DSL 
Internet access, payment transaction processing speeds will remain slow.  Further, in making 
these speedy transaction claims, banks and merchants avoid calling attention to the fact that 
the payment processing step is only a tiny portion of the slow transaction problem.  Until 
EPC tags see widespread use as UPC bar code replacements, customers will still have to wait 
for UPC bar codes to be manually—and individually—scanned.  See, e.g., Evan Schuman, 
Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Chase?, EWEEK, May 26, 2005, http://www.cioinsight.com 
/print_article2/0,1217,a=152846,00.asp [hereinafter Schuman, Big Bad Chase] (“When you cut 
through the hype, all you have is a card that can shave a few seconds—maybe a fraction of a 
minute—off of a transaction. . . . [T]he initial contactless card will still likely live in a wallet 
inside a pocket, which requires time to pull out.”).  These current realities will not likely 
dampen consumers’ enthusiasm for faster, more convenient payment methods such as 
contactless payment systems.  The “microwave” and later generations have developed an 
appetite for speed, convenience, and nifty electronic gadgets and will expect banks and 
merchants to deliver on each of those fronts. 
Convenience claims, on the other hand, appear accurate.  MasterCard International’s 
research “found that nearly half of the country’s consumers carry $20 or less in their wallets 
and 86 percent of the people surveyed said that they would like to lessen the number of times 
that they use cash.”  Christian Meagher, Contactless Payments Take the Plunge, 
ECOMMERCE, Sept. 15, 2004, http://www.insideid.com/ecommerce/article.php/3408481.  
Ubiquitous acceptance of contactless payment transactions would dispense with the need to 
carry cash for any payment transaction—from your corner grocery store to your neighbor’s 
garage sale and to every vending machine in between. 
Security claims lack merit.  See infra notes 65–95 and accompanying text, particularly 
note 74. 
 49. Contactless Payments in a ‘blink,’ supra note 48.  Similarly, MasterCard claims its 
PayPass contactless payment system will allow banks and merchants to increase market share 
because the system is “way speedier than cash” transactions—not “way speedier” than 
traditional credit and debit card transactions.  The RFID Weblog:  MasterCard Contactless 
Payment System Headed to National Rollout, http://www.rfid-weblog.com/archives/ 
mastercard_contactless_payment_system_headed_to_national_rollout.html (last visited Dec. 
22, 2006) (emphasis added); see also Alorie Gilbert, MasterCard Tests High-Tech Payments, 
ZDNET NEWS, Dec. 13, 2002, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-977829.html. 
 50. SMART CARD ALLIANCE, CONTACTLESS PAYMENTS:  DELIVERING MERCHANT 
AND CONSUMER BENEFITS 4 (2004), http://www.smartcardalliance.org/pdf/alliance_activities/ 
contactless_pmt_benefits_report.pdf [hereinafter SMART CARD ALLIANCE, CONTACTLESS 
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Banks and merchants are investing heavily in contactless payment 
technology believing it will indeed yield greater profits:  “Leading banks 
are issuing millions of contactless credit and debit cards to 
consumers . . . . The rate of deployment of contactless infrastructure is 
the highest ever observed for emerging payments products and 
technology in recent memory and speaks of a unique market 
momentum for the industry.”51  “Ubiquitous acceptance across all 
merchants . . . is in process,” the payment associations and bank card 
issuers have already joined forces, and “[m]ajor milestones have already 
occurred.”52  Contactless payment systems will soon be a part of 
everyday life.53 
II.  THE PRIVACY LANDSCAPE 
RFID proponents have recognized the lack of focus by privacy 
advocates regarding the potential dangers of RFID applications: 
Policy and process leaders in government and business, as well as 
the various think tanks, have not really gotten a handle on the 
impacts all these pervasive technologies [including RFID] will 
have on us going forward. 
 . . . .  
 . . . The law is not on your side here—your information is 
being shared.  Mostly because of our own consumerism and 
desire for convenience. . . . What gave them the right?  You did!54 
 
PAYMENTS]. 
 51. SMART CARD ALLIANCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 11, at 2. 
 52. Chase Defines Contactless Payments . . . and Contactless Payments Help Redefine 
Chase—A Conversation with Scott Rau, CONTACTLESS NEWS, Oct. 3, 2005, 
http://www.contactlessnews.com/library/2005/10/03/chase-defines-contactless-payments-and-
contactless-payments-help-redefine-chase-a-conversation-with-scott-rau/.  Chase adds that it 
has “rolled out [its new ‘blink’ contactless payment card] in two regions, acquirers have 
agreed to support it, and merchants are taking it up.”  Id.  As of April 2004, “[m]illions of 
U.S. consumers are already paying for purchases using contactless payment devices, with 
millions more expected this year as new financial industry-backed contactless payment 
initiatives are launched nationwide.”  SMART CARD ALLIANCE, CONTACTLESS PAYMENTS, 
supra note 50.  As of September 19, 2005, Chase had issued more than two million of its blink 
cards.  HSBC Joins Contactless Fray, RFID NEWS, Sept. 19, 2005, http://www.rfidnews.org/ 
news/2005/09/19/hsbc-joins-contactless-fray/. 
 53. See, e.g., Susan Warren, Why Some People Put These Credit Cards in the Microwave, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at A1. 
 54. Lucy West, The Future:  SmallSmartFast, Scary and Fun!, CHAINLINK RES., Jan. 1, 
2004, http://www.chainlinkresearch.com/research/detail.cfm?guid=F8DE5629-37E3-4BB0-
BEFB-3184DC21D442. 
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Privacy advocates’ criticisms, however, have been focused almost 
exclusively on two planned RFID applications:  EPC tags as UPC bar 
code replacements in consumer products, and RFID chips in 
government-issued identification cards and papers.  Privacy concerns 
caused by contactless payment systems have received little, if any, 
attention. 
A.  Very Little Static Has Been Raised Regarding Contactless Payment 
Systems 
When plans to test EPC tags as UPC bar code replacements were 
first announced, privacy advocates responded with vigor, collaborating 
in the publication of an RFID Position Statement of Consumer Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Organizations (RFID Position Statement) in 
November 2003.55  The RFID Position Statement identified five broad 
privacy concerns.56  First, RFID tags could be “embedded into/onto 
objects and documents without the knowledge of the individual who 
obtains those items.”57  Second, each RFID tag produced would have a 
unique EPC, which could allow every physical object to be “identified 
and linked to its purchaser or owner at the point of sale or transfer.”58  
Third, “massive databases” containing EPCs from RFID tags embedded 
in objects could be linked with individuals’ “personal identifying data” 
in the future.59  Fourth, since RFID readers have “already been 
experimentally embedded” in objects such as floor tiles, carpeting, and 
doorframes, RFID readers could also be easily hidden in places where 
RFID tags embedded in objects worn or carried by unsuspecting 
individuals could be scanned.60  Finally, and most importantly, if 
 
 55. RFID Position Statement, supra note 8.  The consortium included eight 
organizations, among them privacy advocacy heavyweights such as the ACLU, EPIC, and the 
EFF.  The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) is a prominent endorser, and many 
other organizations and experts have also endorsed the statement. 
 56. Id.  Each of the five identified concerns does not expressly focus on EPC tags as 
UPC bar code replacements, but each statement does appear rooted in the paradigm that 
RFID-enabled microchips will only be embedded in non-human objects and be used chiefly 
as replacements for UPC bar codes.  See, e.g., Katherine Albrecht, Supermarket Cards:  The 
Tip of the Retail Surveillance Iceberg, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 534, 561–62 (2002) (asserting 
RFID is a “consumer goods tracking system” in which EPC tags appear “in every store-
bought item in a consumer’s home”); see also EFF, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), 
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/RFID/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2006) (asserting RFID is 
“a convenient way to . . . track people and their activities through their belongings”). 
 57. RFID Position Statement, supra note 8. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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“personal identit[ies] were linked with [EPCs,] . . . individuals could be 
profiled and tracked without their knowledge or consent.”61 
Privacy advocates have raised significant static about the potential 
for EPC tags embedded in consumer products to create a surveillance 
infrastructure and, to some extent, have warned of privacy concerns 
caused by government-issued identification cards featuring RFID 
technology.62  Despite these broad statements of concern, privacy 
advocates have not drawn meaningful attention to privacy concerns 
caused by contactless payment systems.  The banks and merchants 
pushing contactless payment systems have not acknowledged that their 
systems intrude on individuals’ privacy either.  Banks and merchants 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Albrecht, supra note 56, at 562 (mentioning without elaboration that RFID 
“applications could include shopping carts that automatically bill consumer’s accounts” and 
focusing the attention of the Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and 
Numbering (CASPIAN) on fighting the global adoption of EPC tags as UPC bar code 
replacements in consumer products); RFID:  Privacy Advocates Question Retailers on Goals 
of ‘RFID’ Tracking Technology, Privacy L. Watch (BNA), at D-2 (June 14, 2004) (quoting 
the EFF’s Tien’s assertion that “we have to think about policy issues” when consumers start 
“bringing home items with [EPC tags] . . . attached to them,” but recognizing no privacy 
concerns caused by contactless payment devices even when consumers make no purchases of 
EPC-tagged consumer products, or that contactless payment devices may be used either to 
purchase things with no EPC tag attached or things not brought home, such as a meal at a 
restaurant or a movie admission ticket); see also Bill Christenson, Veripay Credit-Card 
Implant:  Science Fiction in the News (Nov. 27, 2003), http://www.technovelgy.com/ct/ 
Science-Fiction-News.asp?NewsNum=20 (quoting Beth Givens of the PRC that “a robust 
credit card network based on RFID chips implanted under the skin” would create an 
infrastructure for government surveillance, but reporting no comment by Givens that would 
indicate Givens recognized contactless payment devices in any form factor create the same 
surveillance infrastructure capability); Beth Givens, Dir., PRC, Testimony Before the Cal. 
Leg. J. Comm. on Preparing Cal. for the 21st Century:  RFID and the Public Policy Void 
(Aug. 18, 2003), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/RFIDHearing.htm [hereinafter Givens, 
RFID Public Policy Void] (mentioning credit cards among a long list of objects that could be 
“located and read at a distance” using RFID, but recognizing no privacy concerns so long as 
“businesses use smarter privacy-protective RFID technology than is in use today 
in . . . ExxonMobil’s SpeedPass”); Tien, supra note 10 (focusing attention on RFID-enabled, 
government-issued identification cards).  EPIC notes that Applied Digital’s VeriPay system 
“raises the same privacy issues as [EPC tags,]” but does not articulate any privacy concerns 
with contactless payment devices in other form factors.  EPIC VeriChip Page, 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/verichip.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2006).  It is noteworthy 
that the only mention of the terms “contactless” and “smart chip” in the PRC’s online 
archives are in a posting entitled “RFID Implementation in Libraries.”  See Beth Givens, 
Dir., PRC, Presentation to American Library Association:  RFID Implementation in 
Libraries:  Some Recommendations for “Best Practices” (Jan. 10, 2004), http://www.privacy 
rights.org/ar/RFID-ALA.htm; Lee Tien, Staff Att’y, Presentation to American Library 
Association:  RFID and Libraries:  EFF Talking Points for ALA IFC (Jan. 10, 2004), 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/RFID-ALA.htm. 
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only appear to be concerned with solving fraud-related security issues63 
and, in that context, assert that contactless payment devices should be 
less susceptible to fraud than plastic cards.64  However, security and 
privacy are different things.  Security enables banks, merchants, and 
consumers to protect their money from theft.  Privacy, in general terms, 
is about allowing individuals to control the disclosure of their nonpublic 
personal information.  Addressing security problems in contactless 
payment systems and devices does not address the privacy problems 
caused by contactless payment systems.  Outside the circle of banks and 
merchants pushing contactless payment systems, no other RFID 
proponents are actively discussing privacy concerns caused by 
contactless payment systems.  Whatever the cause of this lack of 
attention to the privacy problems caused by contactless payment 
systems, the privacy problems are numerous and significant. 
B.  What Privacy Problems Are Caused by Contactless Payment 
Systems? 
1.  Security Flaws Cause Privacy Problems 
Unlike the passive RFID microchips used in EPC tags, which can be 
embedded without consumers’ knowledge or consent and could be 
difficult, if not impossible, for consumers to detect or locate, individuals 
carrying contactless payment devices know the precise location of the 
smart chip in their devices and have tacitly consented to carry it.  Precise 
knowledge of the smart chip’s location, coupled with the flawed 
perception that a contactless payment device must be brought within 
inches of a reader to be interrogated, could lead individuals to believe 
they can control any RFID reader’s ability to interrogate their 
contactless payment device and may explain why privacy advocates are 
not more vocal about surreptitious tracking of contactless payment 
devices.65  However, “radio-frequency transmissions” are by their very 
nature “physically insecure,”66 and at least one test has shown that the 
low-frequency passive RFID devices popular in contactless payment 
devices in the United States can be read from “far greater distances than 
 
 63. See infra notes 80–95 and accompanying text. 
 64. See infra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 65. Evan Schuman, How Safe Are the New Contactless Payment Systems?, EWEEK,  
June 20, 2005, http://www.cioinsight.com/print_article2/0,1217,a=154404,00.asp [hereinafter 
Schuman, Contactless Payment]; see also SMART CARD ALLIANCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 
11.  
 66. Tien, supra note 10, at 3. 
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[the two to four-inch read range that] vendors claim.”67  Chase asserts 
that this distance-based threat is irrelevant because its new blink cards 
contain other built-in security measures,68 “including 128-bit and triple 
[Data Encryption Standard (DES)] encryption” plus a cryptogram that 
changes with every transaction.69  Chase’s assertions are not without 
flaws. 
First, not all contactless payment devices feature such advanced 
encryption.  The Texas Instruments Digital Signature Transponder 
 
 67. Schuman, No-Touch Retail, supra note 13.  Shell Canada conducted a test using a 
high-power antenna, the kind it “believe[s] thieves would use,” on “[t]he kind of low-
frequency [passive RFID] tags popular in the United States” in contactless payment devices, 
and found that these tags could be compromised and read from a distance of about ten 
meters.  Schuman, Contactless Payment, supra note 65.  In fact, “[a]ny compatible reader 
within range of the . . . [contactless payment device] could read [any] . . . data” stored on the 
device.  Tien, supra note 10, at 4.  Recent demonstrations by researchers from the University 
of Massachusetts prove this point.  See Weston, supra note 37.   
 68. SMART CARD ALLIANCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 11.  Similar to Chase’s 
assertion of other built-in security measures, the Smart Card Alliance’s Contactless Payments 
Council (Payments Council) asserts that “contactless payment technology . . . is built from the 
ground up on requirements for high security” using “sophisticated smart chip technology with 
built-in intelligence and multiple safeguards specifically designed to protect against fraud.”  
Id. at 3.  The Payments Council never identifies the “other” security measures it asserts exist 
but does appear to identify the true source of these “other” security measures:  “[b]uilt on the 
current payment infrastructure, contactless payments leverage layered security systems.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  The current payment infrastructure touted by the Payments Council 
cannot guarantee security as evidenced by the fact that fraud losses on credit and debit cards 
in the United States grew from $2.37 billion in 2003 to $2.66 billion in 2004—and are 
projected to reach $3.21 billion in 2007.  ePaynews.com, Payment News and Resource Center, 
Statistics for General and Online Card Fraud, http://www.epaynews.com/statistics/ 
fraud.html#21 (last visited Dec. 22, 2006).  MasterCard admits that its new PayPass 
contactless payment device merely “increases [its customers’] feelings of security, since they 
remain in control of their cards during all transactions.”  MBNA America Bank Launches 
Contactless Credit Cards in Atlanta, CONTACTLESS NEWS, Oct. 17, 2005, 
http://www.contactlessnews.com/news/2005/10/17/mbna-america-bank-launches-contactless-
credit-cards-in-atlanta/ (emphasis added).  MasterCard does not make the same broad, 
“layered security” claim asserted by the Payments Council, and if we accept MasterCard’s 
statement as true that only its customers’ “feelings” of security are enhanced by contactless 
payment devices, then such devices will remain exposed to the same sources of fraud that 
have plagued card-based payment methods since their introduction.  As Oliver Steeley, 
MasterCard International’s vice president of wireless payment devices, admits, “Contactless 
cards are safer in some ways and riskier in others, but overall, the new model appears to be a 
security wash.”  Schuman, No-Touch Retail, supra note 13. 
 69. Schuman, Contactless Payment, supra note 65.  “Triple DES is a block cipher 
formed from the Data Encryption Standard (DES) cipher by using it three times.”  
Wikipedia, Triple DES, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple-DES (last visited Dec. 22, 2006).  
Triple DES is a simple way to enlarge the 56-bit key of the Digital Encryption Standard 
(DES) to guard against brute force attacks without having to switch to a new algorithm.  Id. 
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(DST) used in the ExxonMobil Speedpass key fob70 features a forty-bit, 
unpublished, proprietary key that a research team cracked and used to 
clone a device capable of completing fraudulent gasoline purchase 
transactions at ExxonMobil stores.71  Second, despite the privacy and 
security promised when encrypted security keys and cryptographic 
processes are manufactured into contactless payment devices—
including the high-level encryption Chase claims would render any data 
improperly captured from its blink cards useless72—any encryption 
security “scheme is not absolute” when “[t]here is no cardholder 
verification (i.e.[,] a signature or a PIN).”73  Patrick Gauthier, senior vice 
president for emerging products development at Visa, one of Chase’s 
partners in the blink card project, admits that even when factoring in 
132-bit and triple DES encryption, “[a] thief that scanned the [blink 
card] . . . would be able to capture the credit card number”74 stored in 
the device. 
Finally, encryption keys cannot, by themselves, guarantee data 
security.  Lee Tien of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 
speaking in the context of RFID-enabled, government-issued 
identification cards, identified a number of privacy-threatening 
weaknesses with encryption security.75  First,  
[e]ven if [all] the data stored . . . [in a contactless payment 
device] is encrypted, an enormous number of authorized 
users . . . would be in a position to abuse their authorized access 
 
 70. “More than 6 million Speedpass devices have been issued in the U.S.”  Speedpass 
Fact Sheet, http://www2.exxonmobil.com/corporate/files/corporate/speedpass_fact_sheet.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 71. Bono et al., supra note 27, at 2. 
 72. Schuman, Contactless Payment, supra note 65. 
 73. Birch, supra note 11 (emphasis omitted). 
 74. Schuman, Contactless Payment, supra note 65.  As an example: 
[R]ecently, two researchers at the University of Massachusetts pulled unencrypted 
names, account numbers and expiration dates off contactless credit cards using a 
homemade scanning device.  
 . . . [O]ne of the UMass researchers, Tom Heydt-Benjamin, was able to buy 
electronic equipment online using information pulled off a contactless card [while 
the card was] sealed inside an envelope.   
 The “Today” show aired footage demonstrating another data capture, in which 
Heydt-Benjamin concealed the scanner in a briefcase and “read” data from a 
contactless credit card in another person’s back pocket.  
 . . . [A]nyone with the right equipment can read the data, and the equipment 
needed to do so is getting cheaper and more sophisticated all the time. 
Weston, supra note 37. 
 75. Tien, supra note 10, at 7–8. 
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to the data.  If the data were read directly from the cards 
themselves . . . it would be difficult to maintain an audit 
trail . . . and therefore very difficult to detect abuse.76 
Second, even if all the data stored in a contactless payment device is 
encrypted, “an attacker could eavesdrop on a legitimate data 
transmission between the [contactless payment device] and the RFID 
reader.”77  Third, “[b]y definition, every authorized RFID reader can 
decrypt the data stored [in contactless payment devices] [t]hus many 
thousands of readers would have access to the keys needed to read the 
[contactless payment devices],” and it would be “essentially impossible 
to maintain the confidentiality of such widely distributed information.”78  
Fourth, and ominously, 
encryption cannot solve the [surreptitious] tracking problem 
because encrypting unique information will result in different, 
but still unique, information. 
 . . . .  
 . . . So long as any unique identifier is readable without 
additional safeguards, neither encryption nor PIN-based access 
control protects against tracking. If an identifying number is 
available, it can be used to track the card’s movements, and then 
later used to link the card to the holder’s identity.  Even if the 
entire contents of the chip are encrypted, it remains trackable; 
the encrypted data block itself provides a unique identifier.79 
Beyond encryption, critics assert that the few suggested privacy-
related security measures are either ineffective or are too expensive.  
Moreover, the few suggested measures also work to defeat banks’ and 
merchants’ transaction speed and convenience goals for contactless 
 
 76. Id. at 7. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  Tien provides an illustration: 
If every card is protected by the same encryption key or [PIN,] . . . then each 
[authorized] reader would need to have that PIN or key . . . . Researchers have 
successfully extracted PINs from supposedly secure smart cards and successfully 
extracted encryption keys from stolen card readers.  Once the system has been 
compromised, “bootleg” readers could easily be created.  One might also steal the 
PIN or key from inside the system.  Storing the key in, say, an attached computer 
system, rather than in the reader hardware itself, makes this attack easier, not 
harder.  The computer is just as easy as the reader to steal, and generally easier to 
extract the key from.  Over time, the result would be essentially the same as not 
using a PIN and not encrypting the data.  It is hard to imagine how the system would 
recover from this sort of breach. 
Id. 
 79. Id. at 8. 
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payments.  MasterCard, for example, suggested that a password 
requirement may be the answer.80  One disadvantage of requiring a 
password is that it introduces a manual, time-consuming component into 
transaction processing because a password, like a PIN, must be 
manually keyed or otherwise manually transmitted into a POS terminal.  
Moreover, requiring a password would cause transaction processing 
time to be significantly increased, if not doubled.  This is because 
passwords, like PINs, may need to be authenticated in a separate 
“transaction” prior to the payment authorization transaction.  In other 
words, two sets of communication transmissions might be required 
between the POS terminal and the host to complete one payment 
transaction.  Passwords, like PINs, would also be susceptible to 
decryption by thieves using encryption keys from stolen readers.  From 
a practical standpoint, unless passwords are stored in the contactless 
payment device, passwords, like PINs, could also be compromised by 
thieves standing close enough to see, overhear, or otherwise intercept a 
password given during a transaction.  The thief could then steal the 
victim’s contactless payment device and exploit it until the issuer is 
contacted to deactivate the device or the affected account. 
ExxonMobil recently introduced “Zip Code Verification” at its fuel 
dispensers and its in-store POS terminals to help protect its customers 
against fraudulent use of Speedpass devices.81  Like passwords and PINs, 
the need to key-enter a zip code introduces a manual, time-consuming 
component into the transaction-approval process since the zip code 
must be manually keyed and would likely need to be authenticated in a 
separate transaction prior to the payment transaction.  Thieves standing 
nearby could also watch a customer enter his or her zip code and would 
otherwise be able to make fraudulent transactions by stealing both the 
device and the customer’s wallet, which likely contains a driver’s license, 
for example, complete with a zip code printed on its face. 
Another suggestion involves fitting contactless payment devices with 
a “switch to make or break the connection between the chip and 
antenna, [allowing] the cardholder [to] squeeze the switch to turn on the 
card and wave it before a reader to make payments.”82  The idea behind 
this feature is to prevent a device from being scanned by an RFID 
 
 80. Schuman, No-Touch Retail, supra note 13. 
 81. Speedpass:  My Account, New Zip Code Verification—For Your Protection, 
https://www.speedpass.com/forms/frmDynPage.aspx?pPg=ZipVerification.htm&pgType=N 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 82. Prasad Paturi, Switching Off Credit Card Fraud, RFID J., Sept. 12, 2005, 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleprint/1843/-1/82/. 
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reader unless the device’s switch has been squeezed on.83  Such a 
solution adds a manual step to transaction processing, making the use of 
the device less convenient, and this inconvenience would be further 
compounded if a customer had difficulty activating the switch or the 
switch failed.  Moreover, such a system would not defeat a thief’s use of 
a high-powered antenna84 or eavesdropping attack to access any data 
stored on the device while the device is switched on. 
Finally, biometric authentication85 provides a possible solution, but 
critics assert that the costs to implement biometric authentication 
systems are, at present, too expensive to justify their benefit.86  In 
addition, biometric authentication systems insert a manual step into the 
transaction process because the biometric identifier must be manually 
transmitted to the POS terminal.  Like passwords, requiring a biometric 
authentication could significantly increase, if not double, transaction-
processing time.  Further, “[n]o biometric [authentication] method is 
foolproof—identity can be forged in a variety of ways. . . . If someone 
compromises your fingerprint or voiceprint profile, your profile can 
never be truly secure again.”87 
Even if contactless payment device issuers implement a password, 
on-off switch, or biometric fraud prevention system, such devices would 
only provide security at the point-of-sale.  Identity thieves can moot the 
effectiveness of password or biometric-based security systems by using 
pretexting,88 social engineering,89 phishing,90 or pharming91 scams to 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Schuman, Contactless Payment, supra note 65. 
 85. Biometric authentication refers to technologies that primarily measure and analyze 
for authentication purposes such physical characteristics as “fingerprints, eye retinas and 
irises, facial patterns and hand measurements,” and possibly even voiceprint profiles.  See 
Wikipedia, Biometrics, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biometrics (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 86. Paturi, supra note 82. 
 87. Gregory Anderson, Hello Me, It’s Me Again:  The State of Biology-Based Security, 
SMART COMPUTING, Aug. 2005, at 44. 
 88. Pretexting usually involves a person pretending to be a customer contacting a bank 
or merchant and lying or using deception in order to trick the bank or merchant into giving 
up a customer’s nonpublic personal information.  See Wikipedia, Social Engineering 
(Security), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretexting (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 89. Social engineering, in this context, involves “obtaining confidential information by 
manipulation of legitimate users,” usually by a person using a telephone or the Internet to 
exploit individuals’ natural tendency to trust others and thereby tricking individuals into 
revealing, inter alia, nonpublic personal information.  See Social Engineering:  Information 
from Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/social-engineering-security (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2006). 
 90. Phishing involves: 
criminal activity using social engineering techniques. Phishers attempt to 
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obtain sufficient authentication information from a victim and then, for 
example, contact the device’s issuer to have a contactless payment 
device sent to the thief’s own address.  Alternatively, a thief could 
obtain multiple individuals’ nonpublic personal information by hacking 
into a credit issuer’s databases or by working with “insiders with 
knowledge of and access to the system”92 and then, for example, contact 
a device’s issuer to have a contactless device sent to the thief’s own 
address.93 
In sum, the security solutions proposed by banks and merchants will 
do little, if anything, to allay privacy concerns arising from the security 
problems inherent in any contactless payment system, especially given 
the frequency of massive losses of individuals’ nonpublic personal 
information due to fraud, mistake, or other cause.94  It appears that the 
issuers of contactless payment devices can only offer consumers one 
consolation:  if a customer’s contactless payment device is stolen or 
unauthorized charges are otherwise made to his or her account, the 
issuer will not hold the customer liable.95  Such a concession merely 
 
fraudulently acquire sensitive information, such as passwords and credit card details, 
by masquerading as a trustworthy person or business in an electronic 
communication.  Phishing is typically carried out using email or an instant message, 
although phone contact has been used as well. 
Wikipedia, Phishing, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 91. Pharming involves exploiting vulnerabilities in Domain Name System (DNS) 
software, allowing a hacker to hijack the domain name, for example, of a bank or merchant, 
and redirect the bank’s or merchant’s Web site traffic to a bogus site set up for the purpose of 
“obtain[ing] access credentials such as usernames and passwords.”  See Wikipedia, Pharming, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pharming (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 92. Tien, supra note 10, at 2. 
 93. For a comprehensive list (of at least reported cases as of April 20, 2006) of the 
means by which identity thieves have successfully gained access to individuals’ nonpublic 
personal information, see PRC, A Chronology of Data Breaches Since the ChoicePoint 
Incident, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 
2006). 
 94. The frequency of security breaches in which identity thieves gain access to massive 
numbers of individuals’ nonpublic personal information does not appear to be slowing since 
the ChoicePoint debacle, “a watershed event in terms of disclosure to the affected 
individuals,” was made public on February 5, 2005.  Id.  In the fourteen-month period 
following the ChoicePoint incident, 156 security breaches affecting a total of 54,830,477 
individuals were reported in the United States alone.  Id.  The number of actual identity 
thefts in 2005 was a lower number:  255,565 cases of identity theft were reported through the 
FTC’s Sentinel system in 2005.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 4.  One can only 
wonder how many others have simply not yet discovered they are victims. 
 95. See Schuman, Contactless Payment, supra note 65 (reporting that Chase’s new blink 
cards feature “several security factors, including Chase’s ‘zero liability policy,’ which protects 
consumers but not necessarily the retailers”). 
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restates what credit and debit account issuers already do, and it adds 
nothing to compensate individuals whose privacy rights are violated by 
identity thieves. 
Subdermal RFID seems to be the inevitable solution to mitigate 
security problems that cause threats to privacy.  Contactless smart chips 
embedded subdermally in humans would make the device impossible 
for the rightful holder to lose and rather difficult (and barbaric) for a 
thief to steal.96  Assuming subdermal contactless payment devices 
feature 128-bit and triple DES, or higher, encryption for all data stored 
on the subdermal chip, an individual’s subdermal contactless payment 
device would be difficult for all but the most resourceful identity thieves 
to exploit as a source for obtaining a person’s nonpublic personal 
information.97  In addition, even if a thief obtained from other sources 
all the information he or she needed to steal an individual’s identity, 
device issuers could refuse to issue a contactless payment device unless 
the customer appeared in person to have a subdermal contactless device 
with a correct cryptogram implanted in his or her arm or hand—
meaning a device issuer could require whatever personal information it 
wanted of its “implantees” in order to authenticate each customer’s 
identity, making it even more difficult for identity thieves to succeed in 
their schemes.98  That it is difficult does not, however, mean that it is 
impossible.  Issuers of contactless payment devices would still need to 
be wary of identity thieves with insider contacts with access to reset a 
 
 96. Although wearable or pocketable contactless payment devices are not fraud-proof 
because they can easily be lost, stolen, or obtained by thieves who open fraudulent accounts 
using stolen identities, see, e.g., Paturi, supra note 82, Applied Digital asserts that its 
subdermally implantable VeriChip “cannot be lost, stolen, misplaced, or counterfeited.”  
VeriChip Corporation, Solutions, http://www.verichipcorp.com/solutions.html (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2006).  Applied Digital may not have had the stomach to recognize that a thief bent 
on stealing a subdermal contactless payment device might not be deterred by the need to 
extract a subdermal contactless payment device from his victim’s arm or hand. 
 97. See supra notes 70–79 and accompanying text. 
 98. One possibility is that the issuer could ask a series of random, “non-wallet” 
questions, similar to those currently used by credit bureaus when giving persons access to 
credit reports over the Internet.  For example, before releasing a credit report ordered online, 
Equifax asks a series of “non-wallet” questions to authenticate the customer’s identity.  
“Non-wallet” questions are those for which answers are not likely carried in an individual’s 
wallet or purse but are based on information contained in the customer’s credit file and, 
thus—theoretically—knowable only by the person whose credit report is being accessed.  See, 
e.g., Equifax Business Solutions, Online Privacy Policy & Fair Information Principles, 
http://www.equifax.com/universal/privacy.shtml (lasted visited Dec. 22, 2006) (stating 
definition in the “Notice” section); Equifax Personal Solutions:  Credit Reports, Credit 
Scores, Protection Against Identity Theft, http://www.equifax.com/ (last visited Dec. 22, 
2006). 
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cryptogram in an issuer’s database to match the cryptogram in a cloned 
subdermal device.  They would also need to be on guard against identity 
thieves who are able to obtain sufficient nonpublic personal information 
on their victims to show up at the issuer’s location and successfully dupe 
the issuer into issuing a valid subdermal contactless payment device.  
Finally, even if subdermally implanting contactless payment devices 
reduces device theft, banks and merchants would still have to contend 
with other major data security problems.99  Since contactless payment 
device security cannot be guaranteed, individuals’ privacy cannot be 
guaranteed.100 
 
 99. Data security is, indeed, a major problem.  While the actual number of identity theft 
complaints received each year by the FTC is a much lower number, see FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra note 21, at 6, the “Federal Trade Commission estimates that more than 10 
million Americans are victims of such crimes annually, costing individuals $5 billion and 
businesses $48 billion.”  Karim Toubba, Fighting Data Theft, LINE56, July 19, 2005, 
http://www.line56.com/articles/default.asp?articleid=6727.  Toubba points out that in each of 
the massive data thefts in early 2005 from BJ’s Wholesale Club, Polo Ralph Lauren, Bank of 
America, Citibank, DSW Shoe Warehouse, CardSystems, and Lexis-Nexis, “the nature of the 
vulnerability exploited was different, ranging from misplaced backup tapes and unpatched 
servers to hackers accessing important data and many other flaws.”  Id.  Toubba argues that 
“no single technology [including RFID] . . . can safeguard retailers against these varied risks; 
however, more rigorous security training and policies, more robust authentication, and better 
controls over outsourcing entities will all play critical roles in ensuring that critical data 
remains secured.”  Id.  In addition, the data security problem is not limited to just the 
internal, back-office variety.  For example, assuming multiple banks eventually choose to 
adopt and issue subdermal contactless payment devices, individuals will not want to be 
implanted with a separate subdermal chip from every credit, debit or other payment account 
issuer they do business with.  Such consumer resistance would create the need for a single 
subdermal chip accessible by multiple credit, debit or other payment account issuers and by 
all merchants who accept those issuers’ payment methods.  This need for shared access 
among banks and merchants would seem to increase an identity thief’s odds of success due 
largely to the increased number of potential data security attack points.  Worse, if a portion 
of a subdermal chip’s memory was reserved for nonpublic personal identification information 
accessible by all banks, an identity thief’s odds of success could be even greater because the 
thief would only need to access the chip to compromise the victim’s privacy.  Moreover, if 
contactless payment device issuers ever report their devices’ EPCs along with their 
customers’ other nonpublic personal information to data compilation companies such as 
ChoicePoint or credit bureaus such as Equifax, one internal data security breach could have 
far-reaching consequences.  Based on the frequency and variety of the reported data security 
breaches, none of these concerns can be casually dismissed.  See supra notes 93–94 and 
accompanying text. 
 100. There is a feature of active RFID technology that should concern privacy 
advocates:  active RFID technology can be leveraged to make contactless payment devices do 
double-duty as RFID readers by using NFC technology.  Birch, supra note 11.  Although 
most contactless payment devices currently operate on passive RFID technology, future 
generations of contactless payment devices may feature either active RFID microchips, 
microchips capable of operating in both active and passive modes, or even multiple passive 
and active RFID-enabled microchips handling separate functions.  The subdermally-
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2.  “Big Bucks”—Privacy Rights Take a Back Seat to Profits 
In addition to their desire to increase transaction speed and 
convenience for customers, banks and merchants are interested in 
maximizing the return on their investment in contactless payment 
systems by leveraging data gained from customer contacts and 
transactions.101  As the numbers of data collection points and the types 
and amounts of customer data increase, data security will become much 
more important.  In tandem with increased data collection, customers 
will enjoy increased conveniences, but as customers demand more and 
greater conveniences, their privacy may shrink in direct proportion.  
IBM’s “Margaret” project provides an illustration: 
IBM has figured out a way to use RFID to help banks and other 
organizations to identify individual customers . . . . 
 The system involves embedding a UHF RFID tag in a 
passbook or loyalty card. When a customer enters the bank, the 
tag is scanned automatically and the person is identified. . . . 
 
implantable VeriChip used in Applied Digital’s VeriPay system illustrates one current use of 
active, low-frequency RFID smart chips in contactless payment devices.  See VeriChip 
Corporation, supra note 96.  NFC, which is billed as the “next generation of standards” in 
RFID, will permit devices such as mobile phones and PDAs, which have their own onboard 
power sources, to function as passive RFID contactless payment devices when their power is 
turned off or their battery is dead.  Birch, supra note 11.  But when the mobile phone or 
PDA’s power is turned on, the device would be capable of acting as an active RFID device, 
thus enabling it to act as a POS terminal to accept contactless payments from any other 
contactless payment device, including other powered-off mobile phones or PDAs.  Id.  In 
addition to mobile phones and PDAs, iPods, Gameboys, or other hand-held electronic 
devices could double as both contactless payment devices and innocuous-looking RFID 
readers, giving every person in possession of such a device a tool to surreptitiously read the 
EPC, credit, debit, or other account number, and any other nonpublic personal information 
stored on any contactless payment devices, as well as the EPC on any tagged consumer 
product or on any RFID-enabled identification card.  Lee Tien of the EFF reports: 
RFID reading devices are easy to build, and will be easier to build as RFID 
technology spreads.  Nokia last year unveiled a cell phone that can read RFID 
tags . . . . There already exist SD cards for Palm-compatible handhelds that can 
convert popular PDAs like the Treo into RFID readers . . . . German hacker Lukas 
Grunwald used his RFDump software on a PDA equipped with an RFID reader to 
read and write to RFID tags in a German grocery store. 
Tien, supra note 10, at 3 (citations omitted). 
 101. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text; see also John Stermer, Radio 
Frequency ID:  A New Era for Marketers?, CONSUMER INSIGHT MAG., Winter 2001, 
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20020210070506/http://acnielsen.com/pubs/ci/2001/q4/ 
features/radio.htm (“RFID enables the linking of . . . product information with a specific 
consumer identified by key demographic and psychographic markers. . . . [N]ow we can 
correlate multiple points of consumer product purchase with consumption specifics such as 
the how, when and who of product use.”). 
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 . . . [T]he system can be linked to a bank’s customer 
relationship management software, where personal information 
is stored, including how the person like’s [sic] to be addressed 
and a history of [his or her] recent interactions with the bank.102 
“Margaret” illustrates the types of privacy problems that could 
accompany contactless payment systems and, particularly, subdermal 
contactless payment systems. 
First, wearable or pocketable contactless payment devices will not 
deter thieves.  Thus, in searching for viable security solutions, banks and 
merchants will likely recognize that subdermally-implanted contactless 
payment devices could provide the means to reduce fraud 
significantly.103  Second, to make marketing programs like “Margaret” 
work in an environment where contactless payment devices are 
purported to have very short interrogation ranges, banks or merchants 
must either use powerful RFID readers to identify customers from a 
distance or must embed contactless payment devices with a second, 
high-frequency RFID tag which could be interrogated from a greater 
distance.  Third, when customers become accustomed to the 
convenience offered by marketing programs like “Margaret” at all the 
banks and merchants with whom they do business, it would likely be 
easier to convince customers of the convenience of a single contactless 
device readable by every bank or merchant, as opposed to a thick wad 
of plastic cards or a pocket full of key fobs.  Banks and merchants are 
likely to recognize that when consumers’ demand for convenience is 
combined with the better fraud protection offered by subdermally-
implanted contactless payment devices, a “one-subdermally-implanted-
contactless-payment-device-fits-all” solution will be difficult to ignore.104  
Even if subdermal contactless payment systems are neither adopted for 
widespread use nor leveraged for other purposes, the development of 
near-field communication (NFC) technology indicates that banks and 
merchants may be likely to employ RFID-enabled microchips that 
operate, singly, in both passive and active modes—or perhaps both low- 
 
 102. RFID May Boost Service at Banks, RFID J., Apr. 25, 2003, 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/396/1/20/; see also Peter Wray, Building Loyalty 
in a Disloyal World, COLLOQUY, 2004, https://www.colloquy.com/online/past_issues/ 
v12i1/v12i1tpbuilding.asp (“Only companies that understand their customers better than their 
competitors do are very likely to survive. . . . To truly understand me as a customer, you 
must . . . [i]dentify me . . . [and] [t]rack what I buy . . . .”). 
 103. There is one sizeable caveat.  See supra note 99. 
 104. Banks and merchants would still need to address data security since data stored in 
and transmitted by contactless payment devices is not secure even when encrypted.  See supra 
notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
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and high-frequency RFID microchips—in the wearable or pocketable 
contactless devices they issue to achieve their marketing goals.  In such 
a scenario, consumers would expect the presence of a low-frequency 
RFID smart chip in their contactless payment device, even though they 
would not likely know it by its technical name, because that is what 
makes the device work.  However, many consumers might not 
understand the significance of the presence of both a low-frequency 
smart chip and a high-frequency, passive EPC tag—or both passive and 
active RFID smart chips—in their contactless payment devices.  Even if 
customers were made aware of the presence of multiple RFID tags or 
smart chips in their contactless payment devices, customers would not 
attempt to locate and disable them for fear of destroying their device’s 
payment functionality.  Thus, contactless payment devices could 
conceivably become readable from great distances by virtue of a ride-
along, high-frequency EPC tag.  Even if no high-frequency RFID tag 
was used, the low-frequency smart chip could still be read from a 
distance with high-power antennae or still be subject to eavesdropping 
attacks.  Fourth, regardless of the numbers or types of RFID-enabled 
microchips  used in contactless payment devices, the concerns of privacy 
advocates about the surreptitious tracking of individuals by EPC tags 
embedded in consumer products would be a moot issue.  It would be of 
no consequence whether individuals could be tracked by EPC tags 
embedded in, for example, their clothing or shoes because their 
contactless payment devices, assuming they are usually present and 
never transferred to other persons, provide the optimal devices for 
banks and merchants to exploit in gaining intelligence about their 
customers—or for thieves to victimize unsuspecting individuals.  Taken 
together, and combined with the vacuous privacy policies of most banks 
and merchants,105 there is great cause for concern. 
3.  “Big Brother”—Significant Moves Toward Involuntary Surveillance 
 Governments worldwide have already begun to use both passive and 
active RFID microchips for a variety of purposes.  In the United States, 
the Department of Defense mandated that its suppliers provide passive 
RFID tagging on “all freight/cargo containers, cases, pallets and to 
individual ‘high-value’ items that require the military’s UID (Unique 
Identification Code).”106  The Department of Defense also mandated 
 
 105. See infra notes 189–201 and accompanying text. 
 106. RFID 101:  RFID and DoD Policy, http://www.rfid-101.com/rfid-dod.htm (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2006) [hereinafter RFID and DoD Policy]; see also Grant Gross, RFID and 
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that “[c]ontainers shipped outside the continental US [sic] need to have 
active [RFID] tags with content and point of origin information.”107  The 
Department of Homeland Security implemented its “Visa Waiver 
Program” featuring “e-Passports” on October 26, 2006.108  The 
Department of Homeland Security also considered plans for RFID-
based identification cards to be used at border crossings.109  Presumably, 
these applications, should they actually materialize, will make use of 
low-frequency RFID microchips due to the high need for security, 
although federal lawmakers could conceivably mandate that both low-
frequency smart chips and high-frequency EPC tags be embedded in the 
same device, whether carried, worn or even implanted subdermally, in 
order to track individuals’ movements within the longer read ranges 
possible with low-frequency RFID microchips.  But perhaps the largest 
step in the direction of a surveillance society in the United States 
centers on the recent passage of the Real ID Act and the seemingly 
inevitable conclusion that subdermal contactless devices would provide 
a more secure means of identification than cards worn or carried by 
individuals.110  The United States government would not be the first 
government in North America to reach this conclusion:  the Mexican 
government has already implanted active RFID chips into workers’ 
arms as a means of securing access to restricted areas.111 
Privacy advocates’ assertions about the potential uses for RFID 
technology are replete with fears that RFID tags will become a true 
“über-bug.”112  For example, privacy advocates charge that governments 
may use RFID to track and profile individuals by such things as 
“matching customers’ purchases against computer databases . . . [and] 
 
Privacy:  Debate Heating Up in Washington, INFOWORLD, May 28, 2004, http://www.info 
world.com/article/04/05/28/HNrfidprivacy_1.html. 
 107. RFID and DoD Policy, supra note 106. 
 108. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., VISA WAIVER PROGRAM TRAVELER GUIDE 
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/vwp_travelerguide.pdf. 
 109. Jonathan Krim, U.S. May Use New ID Cards at Borders, WASH. POST, June 5, 
2004, at E01. 
 110. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, FAQ:  How Real ID Will Affect You, CNET 
NEWS.COM, May 6, 2005, http://news.com.com/FAQ+How+Real+ID+will+affect+you/2100-
1028_3-5697111.html. 
 111. See Will Weissert, Microchips Implanted in Mexican Officials, MSNBC.COM,  July 
14, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5439055/. 
 112. Kobelev, supra note 32, at 331.  By “über-bug,” Kobelev appears to mean “super-
bug”:  “RFID technology has the potential to . . . lead[] to a world in which our physical 
location is never safe from the prying eye of the government, companies, or a hacker.  As 
RFID technology proliferates, it will literally surround future consumers wherever they go 
and whatever they do.”  Id. at 330–31. 
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tracking a person’s physical location.”113  Katherine Albrecht and Liz 
McIntyre allege that the United States “government plan[s] to order 
RFID chips embedded in all cars sold in America,” which would allow 
“police [to] . . . track your comings and goings by putting inexpensive 
RFID readers at key intersections.”114  However, no privacy advocate 
appears to consider that governments could track and profile individuals 
by interrogating individuals’ contactless payment devices.115 
Regardless of the reason for the lack of dialogue on privacy issues 
caused by contactless payment systems, the public will not be best 
served by having such privacy issues addressed after contactless 
payment devices are widely distributed and used.  The public would be 
best served by reasoned, careful analysis of the issues now.  The 
Supreme Court has already ruled that individuals cannot refuse to 
identify themselves when government agents demand that they disclose 
their identity.116  Since it is the “involuntary nature of a government 
mandate . . . [that would make such a mandate] particularly 
dangerous”117 to individuals’ privacy rights, privacy issues caused by 
contactless payment systems should be addressed now.  Otherwise, 
contactless payment devices—with the aid of a little function creep and 
widespread distribution—could serve as a proxy for the secured form of 
identification mandated by the Real ID Act.118  Unfortunately, the 
discussion of privacy concerns with all types of RFID applications 
appears to have lost traction at both the federal and state level. 
C.  The Giant Sucking Sound Is the Public Policy Vacuum 
Contactless payment systems produce privacy concerns that should 
be addressed by legislators at either the federal or state level because:  
(1) contactless payment devices are already widely distributed in several 
form factors and are quickly approaching ubiquity; (2) contactless 
 
 113. Id. at 330. 
 114. Hiawatha Bray, You Need Not Be Paranoid to Fear RFID, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 
10, 2005, at F2, available at http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2005/10/10/you_ 
need_not_be_paranoid_to_fear_rfid?mode=PF. 
 115. Lee Tien hinted at the possibility of such government surveillance, but neither 
Tien nor any other privacy advocate appears to have specifically addressed the issue.  See 
Tien, supra note 10, at 4–5, 8. 
 116. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004). 
 117. Jerry Brito, Relax, Don’t Do It:  Why RFID Privacy Concerns Are Exaggerated and 
Legislation Is Premature, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 5 (2004), http://www.lawtechjournal.com/ 
articles/2004/05_041220_brito.pdf. 
 118. Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
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payment systems could be exploited as an infrastructure for the 
surreptitious tracking and profiling of individuals; and (3) individuals 
will not disable the smart chips in their contactless payment devices, at 
least not those in form factors other than traditional credit or debit card 
plastics, because doing so would destroy their contactless payment 
device’s utility.119  Despite these realities, no federal or state legislation 
addressing the privacy concerns caused by any RFID application has 
been enacted.  Most of the states that have considered RFID privacy 
legislation have only considered it in the context of EPC-tagged 
consumer products, and no state has considered privacy legislation 
directed at contactless payment systems.  It now appears doubtful that 
concerns about RFID applications will regain sufficient momentum to 
be addressed at the legislative level in the near future. 
1.  No State Has Enacted Privacy Legislation Directed at Any RFID 
Application 
California was one of the first states to take up RFID privacy 
concerns.  At a California Legislature Joint Committee hearing in mid-
2003 entitled Preparing California for the 21st Century, Beth Givens of 
the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) asserted that RFID had 
“sprung upon the scene with little attempt so far to address its many 
probable adverse impacts upon society.”120  Givens warned: 
We human beings interact and surround ourselves with a huge 
number of objects—our clothes, the furniture and appliances in 
our home, the consumer electronics we use, the food we buy, our 
automobiles . . . [and even] credit cards . . . . 
 Massive data bases [sic] will not only contain the unique 
product codes, but also personally identifying information 
 
 119. Warren, supra note 53.  Individuals may be able to microwave a credit or debit 
card to “fry” an embedded contactless smart chip and still have a working credit card to use 
afterward because their card’s magnetic stripe could still be swiped through any POS 
terminal’s card reader.  However, individuals would not “fry” their key fob, watch, or mobile 
phone to disable a contactless smart chip because doing so would destroy such devices’ 
payment-method functionality.  Since form factors are trending away from card plastics, the 
microwave, metal wallet, and other gadget-based solutions mentioned by Warren, id. at A1, 
A16, will not provide adequate security or privacy protection for users of contactless payment 
devices in form factors other than credit or debit card plastics.  For example, FoeBud’s 
copper bracelet with a red light that blinks when near an RFID reader, id. at A16, is not a 
viable solution because when the light blinks, it is already too late to react—the contactless 
smart chip would have already been interrogated.  Will we reduce ourselves to carrying our 
mobile phones in metal sheaths, our key chains in metal-lined pants pockets, and wear wide, 
metal bracelets over our wristwatches? 
 120. Givens, RFID Public Policy Void, supra note 62. 
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connecting us with the RFID-coded items we buy or otherwise 
obtain.  It is this association of personal identity with the object’s 
unique identity that will enable both profiling and location 
tracking.121 
While Givens mentioned credit cards and ExxonMobil’s Speedpass, 
she did not directly address the privacy concerns caused by contactless 
payment systems.122  Instead, Givens focused on plans to replace UPC 
bar codes with EPC tags, recommending that California:  (1) require 
merchants to display clearly which products contain EPC tags; (2) 
require merchants to disclose when, where, and why EPC tags in 
products are being read; (3) require that individuals be provided a 
means of removing or permanently disabling RFID-enabled microchips 
in products they purchase or otherwise obtain, including credit or debit 
cards; (4) require that individuals be allowed to own readers to detect 
and permanently disable EPC tags; (5) require that individuals be 
allowed access to data about themselves stored in an RFID device; (6) 
require stringent security in system access, database access, and data 
transmissions; and (7) require accountability among users of RFID 
technology and its resultant data.123  These recommendations focus 
primarily on the use of EPC tags as UPC bar code replacements and, as 
a result, do not address privacy concerns caused by contactless payment 
devices.  Regardless, Givens’s privacy concerns did not ultimately move 
California legislators.  The California Senate killed a bill124 that would 
have required retail stores using EPC tags as UPC bar code 
replacements to either detach or destroy RFID tags before consumers 
left the store.125  A bill addressing privacy concerns with RFID-enabled 
identification documents such as drivers’ licenses and student 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Givens’s decision not to make a bigger issue of contactless payment systems is 
noteworthy since, just three months before, she had responded to Applied Digital’s 
announcement of a successful field-test of a GPS-trackable, subdermal contactless device 
with a brief statement recognizing that such devices could be used to create a robust credit 
card network that could form the ‘“infra-structure [sic] for potential government 
surveillance.’”  Christenson, supra note 62. 
 123. Givens, Public Policy Void, supra note 62. 
 124. See CAL. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, 2004 LEGISLATIVE DIGEST (2004), 
http://www.dca.ca.gov/legis/2004/privacy.htm#sb1834 (noting the failure of S.B. 1834, 2003–
2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004), sponsored by then-Senator Debra Bowen, who was elected 
California’s Secretary of State in November 2006). 
 125. S.B. 1834, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). 
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identification cards126 was placed on the inactive file where it 
subsequently died.127 
Following California’s lead, several other states considered privacy 
legislation targeted at EPC-tagged consumer products, but all the 
proposed bills were either killed in committee128 or given their last 
rites.129  Maryland, Virginia, and Utah considered legislation that would 
have required studies of privacy concerns caused by RFID technology, 
but none of those bills were enacted.130  South Dakota considered 
legislation that would have prohibited the implantation of an RFID 
microchip in any person,131 but that bill also died in committee.132  Even 
if any of these bills had become law, only South Dakota’s proposal to 
prohibit the subdermal implantation of RFID chips in humans could 
 
 126. S.B. 768, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005). 
 127. See S.B. 768, Current Bill Status, http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_0751-
0800/sb_768_bill_20061130_history.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 128. Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah have each 
killed bills targeted at EPC-tagged consumer products.  See S.B. 128, 93d Gen. Assem., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005); A.B. 264, 73d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2005); H.B. 215, 47th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2005); H.B. 1136, 80th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2005); S.B. 699, 
104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2005); S.B. 867, 92d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2004); H.B. 251, 55th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004). 
 129. Missouri is considering—for the third time—a bill targeted at EPC-tagged 
consumer products, but that bill is currently in the same committee that killed the two earlier 
attempts.  See S.B. 638, 93d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006).  After more than a year 
of inactivity, a bill in the Tennessee House was assigned to subcommittee and then promptly 
removed from the subcommittee’s calendar.  See H.B. 300, 104th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 
(Tenn. 2005).  The Massachusetts House and Senate are considering identical bills targeted at 
EPC-tagged consumer products.  See H.B. 1447, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005); S.B. 
181, 184th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005).  Both bills were referred to committee in 
January 2005.  A source in State Senator Jarrett T. Barrios’s office advised that the Senate 
version’s reporting date was extended until June 15, 2006, and that Senator Barrios planned 
to argue that the bill should be presented to the full Senate for a vote.  However, on May 30, 
2006, the Senate sent the bill packing to a “joint committee . . . to make an investigation and 
study of” the issues addressed in the bill—which may be its death knell.  S2564-SJ 2081, 
Order History, http://www.mass.gov/legis/184history/s02564.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2006); 
see also S.B. 181, Bill History, http://www.mass.gov/legis/184history/ s00181.htm (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2006).  The bill in the House is suffering an identical fate.  See H. 5007, Order 
History, http://www.mass.gov/legis/184history/h05007.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2006); see also 
H.B. 1447, Bill History, http://www.mass.gov/legis/184history/h01447.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 
2006). 
 130. See H.B. 354, 419th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005); see also H.B. 32, 418th 
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2004); H.B. 1304, 2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2004); 
S.J.R. 10, 55th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004). 
 131. H.B. 1114, 80th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2005). 
 132. See H.B. 1114, Bill Action Summary, http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2005/1114.htm 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
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have had any potential effect on the future of contactless payment 
systems. 
In the midst of all the carnage from bills killed in other states, New 
Hampshire considered a bill to prohibit the state’s participation in a 
national identification card system under the Real ID Act133 and enacted 
a bill prohibiting the use of radio frequency devices to identify the 
occupants of motor vehicles while on any public road or street in the 
state.134  The bill opposing national identification cards, however, met a 
fate identical to the original version of House Bill 203-FN, which sought 
to impose comprehensive requirements on the use of RFID technology 
in New Hampshire.135  House Bill 203-FN passed the New Hampshire 
 
 133. See Introduction of H.B. 1582, 159th Gen. Ct., 28 H. Rec. No. 7, H.J. No. 1, Jan. 4, 
2006, available at http://gencourt.state.nh.us/hcaljourns/journals/2006/houjou2006_7.html.  
After passing in the House, the New Hampshire Senate amended H.B. 1582 into an Act to 
merely “establish a commission to study the Real ID Act of 2005.”  H.B. 1582, 159th Gen. 
Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2006), available at http:/www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/ 
2006/HB1582.html.  It appears even the stripped-down version has been killed in the Senate.  
See H.B. 1582 Activity & Status, http://www.generalcourt.org/bills/2006/HB1582/ status (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 134. H.B. 1738-FN, 159th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2006), available at http://www.gen 
court.state.nh.us /legislation/2006/HB1738.html. 
 135. H.B. 203-FN, 159th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2006) (showing the bill’s text as 
amended and passed by the New Hampshire House).  The version of the bill passed by the 
New Hampshire House is no longer available on the New Hampshire General Court’s bill 
tracking system.  The bill, as amended by the New Hampshire House, addressed any RFID 
tag capable of transmitting individuals’ nonpublic personal information, including “name, 
address, [phone numbers], social security number, credit card and financial account numbers, 
driver’s license number, e-mail address, date of birth, race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, 
political affiliation, photograph and digital image, fingerprint or other biometric 
identification, and any other unique personal identifier or number.”  Id.  This description 
encompassed contactless payment systems, but only required that credit, debit, or other 
financial account cards containing RFID-enabled microchips bear a label containing a 
“universally accepted symbol” to designate the RFID transponder’s presence, frequency, and 
data structure.  Id.  The bill would also have prohibited the implantation of subdermal RFID 
devices in individuals “without the informed, written consent of the individual, or an 
individual’s legal guardian,” and would have prohibited offering incentives, denying 
opportunities, or “in any way treat[ing any individual] differently from any other individual as 
a consequence of providing or withholding such consent.”  Id.  State Representative Howard 
C. Dickinson, the bill’s primary sponsor, never responded to the author’s inquiry about the 
changes to the original House version of the bill. 
Considering that much less restrictive measures in other states had already failed, it 
seemed doubtful that New Hampshire’s bill would succeed.  Even if the bill had become law, 
a label on each contactless payment device designating the RFID transponder’s presence, 
frequency, and data structure would not have addressed the privacy concerns caused by 
contactless payment systems.  It appeared New Hampshire would have been satisfied as long 
as a label was present to make customers aware of the presence of RFID-enabled microchips 
in their contactless payment devices. 
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House, but after a hearing in the Senate on March 8, 2006, the bill was 
renamed and amended to merely “establish[] a commission . . . [to] 
study the use of radio frequency technology in the private and public 
sectors, its benefits, and potential privacy implications.”136  Given the 
far-flung failures of privacy-related RFID technology bills and the fact 
that the final versions of both House Bills 203-FN and 1582 were 
stripped of their original teeth, it seems unlikely that New Hampshire 
will enact any legislation restricting RFID technology. 
2.  Congress Only Mulls Privacy Legislation Aimed at EPC-Tagged 
Consumer Products 
In mid-2003, the non-profit organization Consumers Against 
Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (CASPIAN) unveiled its 
model RFID Right to Know Act of 2003, “calling for mandatory 
disclosures on consumer products containing [EPC tags]” in order to 
“protect consumers against unwittingly purchasing products embedded 
with remote surveillance devices.”137  Despite including “ATM cards” in 
the list of things people buy that could be embedded with RFID-
enabled microchips,138 CASPIAN did not articulate a specific need for 
privacy legislation regarding contactless payment systems, and even if it 
had, the Act’s narrow purpose was merely “[t]o require that 
commodities containing radio frequency identification tags bear labels 
stating that fact.”139 
In 2004, the federal government responded with equally narrow 
vision.  At a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) workshop entitled Radio 
Frequency Identification:  Applications and Implications for 
Consumers, Beth Givens of the PRC explained that RFID “could 
threaten privacy and civil liberties” and “call[ed] for a comprehensive 
multi-disciplinary ‘technology assessment’ of RFID.”140  However, 
 
 136. H.B. 203-FN, 159th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2006), available at http://www.gen 
court.state.nh.us/legislation/2006/HB0203.html (showing the bill’s title and text as amended 
and passed by the New Hampshire Senate). 
 137. Press Release, CASPIAN, Consumer Group Unveils RFID Labeling Legislation 
(June 11, 2003), available at http://www.spychips.com/press-releases/right-to-know-
release.html (emphasis added). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Summary of RFID Right to Know Act, http://www.spychips.com/press-
releases/right-to-know-summary.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2006) (including the full text of the 
proposed legislation). 
 140. Beth Givens, Dir., PRC, Presentation at the Federal Trade Commission RFID 
Workshop, Implementing RFID Responsibly:  Calling for a Technology Assessment (June 
21, 2004), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/FTC-RFIDTestimony.htm (emphasis added). 
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Givens only discussed RFID technology in the context of EPC tags as 
UPC bar code replacements, again failing to address privacy concerns 
caused by either contactless payment systems or other RFID 
applications. 
Two days after the FTC workshop, Representative Gerald Kleczka 
proposed the Opt Out of ID Chips Act,141 a bill significant for two 
reasons:  (1) it only addressed privacy concerns with EPC tags as UPC 
bar code replacements, and (2) it marked the first—and last—time 
Congress addressed RFID’s impact on individuals’ privacy rights.  The 
Act would have made it a deceptive or unfair practice for a retailer to 
sell a product containing an EPC tag unless:  (1) the product bears a 
label stating it contains an EPC tag, (2) the label notifies the customer 
that he or she has the right to have the EPC tag removed or disabled at 
the point-of-sale, and (3) the customer is actually given the option of 
removing or disabling the EPC tag at the point-of-sale.  Shortly after the 
bill’s referral to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection held a 
hearing entitled Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology:  
What the Future Holds for Commerce, Security, and the Consumer.142  
Representative Cliff Stearns, subcommittee chairperson, opened with 
remarks indicating the hearing was supposed to have a broad purpose: 
I’m pleased to say that this subcommittee will attempt to get out 
in front and conduct the first congressional hearing on . . . 
[RFID] technology . . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [O]ur job [is] to cut through [the] hype, get the facts about 
RFID, learn more about its applications, and examine the public 
policy issues generated by its use and widespread deployment.143 
Despite Representative Stearns’s intention to “get out in front” of 
RFID technology, his comments seemed to foreshadow a narrow focus 
on EPC-tagged consumer products: 
These RFID tags can be attached to products and packaging 
individually. 
 . . . . 
 
 141. H.R. 4673, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004). 
 142. Hearing, supra note 8. 
 143. Id. at 1, 3 (statement of Hon. Cliff Stearns, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection).  Note that Representative Stearns referred to RFID’s 
“applications” in the plural, hinting that the discussion to come would cover the details of at 
least several RFID applications.  Id. 
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 . . . [W]ork is being done to develop common standards 
known as the Electronic Products Code or “EPC” . . . . [which] 
would allow RFID readers to receive EPC data from tags on 
items and products . . . . 
 . . . [T]his is a global effort and, in theory, could lead to a 
seamless supply chain and logistics management in global 
trade.144 
Representative Stearns alluded once to contactless payment systems: 
One possible future application . . . involves using readers at 
checkout. . . . [to] allow customers to pass straight through with 
their RFID tagged items loaded in their shopping carts.  
Customer accounts would be automatically updated leaving 
them free to head straight for the parking lot.145   
However, neither Representative Stearns nor any other member 
recognized the privacy concerns caused by “automatic” payment 
technology. 
Representative Janice Schakowsky voiced the strongest criticisms of 
RFID technology in her opening comments, but also seemed to join the 
chorus focusing only on concerns with EPC tags embedded in such 
objects as clothing and passports.146  Representative Schakowsky 
indicated that she saw no privacy concerns with contactless payment 
systems, stating that she appreciated the convenience RFID technology 
brought to “E-Z passe [sic] and SmartCards for public 
transportation.”147 
It is possible that the hearing’s narrow focus was inevitable.  Dr. 
Sanjay Sarma of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the first 
presenter to speak at the hearing, stated that his comments were 
“focused entirely on the supply chain, because that is where the interest 
primarily now lies and what the current technology is capable of 
providing.”148  Sarma’s gauge for assessing those interests appears to 
have been drawn from his projection that replacing UPC bar codes with 
EPC tags could generate savings in excess of $550 billion per year.149  
 
 144. Id. at 1–2. 
 145. Id. at 2. 
 146. Id. at 3 (statement of Hon. Janice Schakowsky, Member, Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection). 
 147. Id. at 4. 
 148. Id. at 13 (prepared statement of Sanjay Sarma, Assoc. Professor, Mass. Inst. 
Tech.). 
 149. Accenture, a management consulting and technology services company, estimated 
that “RFID could eliminate 15 to 30 percent of missing inventory,” that “the retail industry 
alone loses more than $50 billion a year to theft, paperwork errors, and vendor fraud,” and 
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But it was Sarma’s assertion that EPC tags as UPC bar code 
replacements represented the full expression of “what the current 
technology [was] capable of providing,” coupled with his assertion that 
it was “impossible to anticipate the full spectrum of uses to which RFID 
[t]echnology . . . will be placed” that may have discouraged any in-depth 
discussion of any other RFID application.150 
Sarma’s intention to focus the hearing on EPC tags surfaced in his 
very first sentence.  To explain how RFID-enabled microchips work, 
Sarma held up two EPC tags and said,  “An RFID tag is a chip and an 
antenna.  It has no battery.  It is simply a chip and an antenna.”151  By 
this, Sarma made it clear that he would address only passive RFID 
technology as active RFID microchips contain batteries;152 he thus 
ignored the VeriChip and contactless payment systems that operate on 
NFC technology.  Next, Sarma demonstrated that his sample EPC tag 
had a read range of about ten feet153 but did not mention that the read 
range of any RFID tag, whether operating on a low or high frequency, is 
as much dependent on the power and size of the reader’s antenna.  
Sarma did not demonstrate how a high-power antenna could be used to 
increase the read range of any RFID tag.154  No subcommittee member 
or privacy advocate present at the hearing questioned or challenged 
Sarma’s omissions.  Following the demonstration, Sarma continued his 
narrow focus, opining that “where [RFID is] heading” is only to 
“lubricate the supply chain” from manufacturer to retailer and to 
produce “better shopping experiences for consumers and [improved] 
 
that “[p]roduct counterfeiting costs another $500 billion a year worldwide.”  Id.  Researchers 
at Emory University concluded that “the average retailer loses 4 percent of its sales due to 
out-of-stock” items.  Id. at 17 (prepared statement of Linda M. Dillman, Exec. Vice President 
& Chief Info. Officer, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.).  Wal-Mart reported $312.4 billion in sales in the 
fiscal year ending January 31, 2006.  See Wal-Mart, Corporate Facts:  Wal-Mart By the 
Numbers, http://www.walmartfacts.com/FactSheets/10242006_Corporate_Facts.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2006).  If Wal-Mart lost four percent of its annual sales due to out-of-stock 
items, it would lose $12.5 billion in sales per year.  In other words, Wal-Mart’s annual lost 
sales due to out-of-stock items alone could equal the 2004 gross national income of Estonia, 
the world’s 98th largest economy.  See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
DATABASE (2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/ 
GNI.pdf. 
 150. Hearing, supra note 8, at 13 (prepared statement of Sanjay Sarma, Assoc. 
Professor, Mass. Inst. Tech.). 
 151. Id. at 7. 
 152. Passive RFID chips do not have a battery; active RFID chips have batteries.  
That’s what makes them “active.”  See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 153. Hearing, supra note 8, at 8 (statement of Sanjay Sarma, Assoc. Professor, Mass. 
Inst. Tech.). 
 154. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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efficiency all across the global supply chain.”155  It was clear that Sarma 
would not acknowledge privacy concerns caused by contactless payment 
systems or any other RFID application. 
Sarma’s presentation also provided support for RFID proponents’ 
assertions that privacy concerns about RFID are overblown and that 
legislators should permit self-regulation.  Sarma’s proposed guidelines 
for companies engaged in the “large-scale deployment of EPC” to use in 
developing their own privacy practices only addressed EPC tags as UPC 
bar code replacements:  (1) give consumers notice of EPC tags on 
product packaging, (2) give consumers the option to disable or remove 
EPC tags on products purchased, (3) make it easy for consumers to get 
information on EPC tags, and (4) require companies using data 
generated through EPC to comply with applicable laws.156 
Ultimately, the subcommittee went no further than where Sarma 
and the other testifying RFID proponents led it.  Linda Dillman, Chief 
Information Officer for Wal-Mart, asserted that “[i]n the future, EPCs 
have the potential to help us minimize wait time at checkouts,” but that 
“[t]here is no additional information about individuals, available or 
collected, via RFID because [EPC] codes identify products and not 
people.”157  Even though Dillman did not acknowledge the potential 
impact on individuals’ privacy rights of any RFID application other than 
EPC tags, Dillman’s assurances that Wal-Mart would not collect data 
from RFID tags in any form is contradicted by Wal-Mart’s own 
consumer privacy policy, a copy of which Dillman provided in her 
prepared statement.  The policy states that Wal-Mart “will collect and 
use . . . information about you which is, or can be, tied to you as an 
individual” including “identification numbers, account numbers, 
product preferences, and other information you provide when you do 
business with us . . . [and] financial . . . information provided by 
you . . . in connection with your transactions.”158  It is noteworthy that 
within months of the hearing, Wal-Mart introduced a Wal-Mart Credit 
Card and a Wal-Mart Discover Card159—cards that could easily be 
 
 155. Hearing, supra note 8, at 9–11 (prepared statement of Sanjay Sarma, Assoc. 
Professor, Mass. Inst. Tech.). 
 156. Id. at 12. 
 157. Id. at 14 (statement of Linda M. Dillman, Exec. Vice President & Chief Info. 
Officer, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.). 
 158. Id. at 18–19. 
 159. Wal-Mart’s two new credit cards were introduced on February 22, 2005.  David 
Wells, Morgan Stanley Faces Investor Grilling Over Discover Card Unit, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 
2005, at 29. 
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issued in contactless payment device form factors in the near future.  
GE Money Bank (GEMB), the issuer of the two cards, states that it will 
provide Wal-Mart and its affiliates, licensees, and “third-party service 
providers (such as modeling and database companies)” with 
cardholders’ nonpublic personal information on a scale much greater 
and more invasive than Wal-Mart’s own privacy policy:  GEMB can 
provide Wal-Mart with cardholders’ transaction information on the 
Wal-Mart Discover Card even when cardholders’ transactions are not 
made at Wal-Mart.160 
While Sarma and Dillman narrowed the subcommittee’s focus, 
William Galione of Philips Semiconductors expressly dismissed the 
possibility that contactless payment systems could cause privacy 
concerns.  Galione admitted that one of the “most common applications 
of contactless identification technology” is its use “by people to identify 
themselves,” including, for example, using “‘[s]mart cards’ [that] 
typically come in a credit card form factor and carry sensitive, 
personally identifiable data.”161  However, Galione dismissed privacy 
concerns about any type of contactless identification device as 
unwarranted because such contactless devices are readable from only 
“three to four inches away,” are “very, very secure . . . [with] advanced 
encryption technologies[,] . . . password protection and mutual 
authentication between the card and the reader,”162 and offer the 
“enhanced security and privacy protection” of “biometric credentials.”163  
 
 160. See Wal-Mart Credit Services, http://www.walmartcreditcard.com (last visited Dec. 
22, 2006).  Wal-Mart’s credit cards are issued through GE Money Bank (GEMB), a member 
of the General Electric corporate family.  Id.  GEMB’s privacy policy promises that “through 
your use of [the Wal-Mart credit cards]” GEMB will “collect personally identifiable 
information about you . . . [including] transaction information about items purchased . . . for 
identification . . . servicing and marketing purposes.”  See Wal-Mart Financial Services, Wal-
Mart Credit Card and Wal-Mart Discover GE Money Bank Privacy Policy, 
https://www.onlinecreditcenter2.com/walmartstorecard/csgen2w2/WFWprivacy.htm (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2006).  Upon collecting this information, GEMB promises to share it with, 
amongst others, “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and its affiliates . . . licensees, or third-party service 
providers (such as modeling and database companies)” for any purpose “permitted by law.”  
Id. 
 161. Hearing, supra note 8, at 32–33 (prepared statement of William Galione, Vice 
President & Gen. Manager, Philips Semiconductors). 
 162. Id. at 30–31 (statement of William Galione, Vice President & Gen. Manager, 
Philips Semiconductors). 
 163. Id. at 33 (prepared statement of William Galione, Vice President & Gen. Manager, 
Philips Semiconductors).  As proof, Galione offered:  “The DoD makes worst case scenario 
assumptions about [its contactless identification] cards falling into the wrong hands and 
having large resources at their disposal to crack the card—standards that advanced smart 
cards have met through the use of encryption, secure design, and other measures.”  Id. 
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Galione ultimately addressed privacy solely in the context of EPC-
tagged consumer products.164  No subcommittee member or privacy 
advocate in attendance challenged Galione’s summary dismissal of 
privacy concerns caused by contactless payment systems. 
Each privacy advocate who testified focused almost exclusively on 
EPC-tagged consumer products.  Paula Bruening of the Center for 
Democracy and Technology (CDT) identified as one of the “novel 
privacy issues raised by RFID” the reality that “[d]iscount cards, other 
‘customer loyalty cards’ and credit cards already collect information 
about individuals, providing a rich store of information about our likes 
and dislikes.”165  However, Bruening turned her focus to EPC-tagged 
consumer products,166 perhaps due to a perception that any privacy 
issues caused by contactless payment systems would be addressed by 
federal privacy laws already regulating “credit cards . . . and financial 
records.”167  One of Bruening’s greatest concerns was that data from 
EPC-tagged consumer products would be collected without the “active 
engagement” of consumers.168  Bruening explained by using a credit card 
transaction analogy: 
When I used [sic] a credit card, I am actively deciding to turn 
over certain information that will make it possible to complete a 
transaction. . . . RFID data collection . . . . does not actively 
engage the consumer at all and provides the consumer with no 
record that the data collection ever happened.169 
Arguably, a person using a contactless payment device to make a 
payment transaction may not have a legitimate expectation of privacy at 
that moment since he or she, just like a person using a credit or debit 
card, would be voluntarily disclosing the data necessary to make a 
payment transaction.170  However, this reasoning ignores the major 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 26 (prepared statement of Paula J. Bruening, Staff Counsel, CDT). 
 166. Id. at 24 (statement of Paula J. Bruening, Staff Counsel, CDT).  Some of 
Bruening’s greatest concerns were that EPC tags “[i]nserted into the sleeve of a blouse or the 
hem of a pair of trousers” would permit an “invisible,” “more fine grained [method of] data 
collection than previously possible,” that consumers may not know such EPC tags were 
present, and that the information collected about the consumer would be without the 
consumer’s “active engagement.”  Id. 
 167. Id. at 27 (prepared statement of Paula J. Bruening, Staff Counsel, CDT).  Bruening 
may have been referring to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).  See infra notes 189–191 
and accompanying text. 
 168. Hearing, supra note 8, at 24 (statement of Paula J. Bruening, Staff Counsel, CDT). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.  Bruening’s logic is similar to that applied in Katz v. United States where the 
Court stated individuals do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in things they 
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difference between credit and debit cards and contactless payment 
devices:  traditional credit and debit cards with magnetic stripes can only 
be read when swiped through a POS terminal during a payment 
transaction or by other devices capable of reading magnetic stripes, 
while contactless payment devices can be read from a distance even 
when individuals are not using their devices to make payments. 
In other testimony at the hearing, Cédric Laurant of the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) mentioned, in passing, “electronic 
roadway toll collection,”171 but then focused his attention solely on the 
use of EPC tags as UPC bar code replacements.172  Barry Steinhardt of 
the ACLU addressed “consumer issues”173 that dealt only with 
“retailers . . . engaged in a major push to advance adoption of RFID 
technology . . . [with] RFIDs eventually replacing UPC bar codes on 
products.”174  Steinhardt provided several scenarios to illustrate his 
concerns, but each dealt only with the ability to track and profile 
individuals using EPC tags in consumer goods.175 
Ultimately, the broad reaches of RFID technology on commerce, 
security, and consumers were not discussed; the hearing, instead, 
focused almost exclusively on EPC tags as UPC bar code replacements.  
Representative Kleczka’s bill never made it past the subcommittee, and 
no RFID privacy legislation has since been introduced.  Privacy 
concerns about RFID applications appear to be dead at both the state 
and federal levels without any meaningful discussion of the privacy 
concerns caused by contactless payment systems. 
III.  IN SEARCH OF AN APPROPRIATE PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSE 
A.  Privacy Advocates Rely on Inapposite Fair Information Principles 
Privacy advocates’ proposals for regulating RFID technology do not 
address privacy problems caused by contactless payment systems.  In his 
 
“knowingly expose[] to the public.”  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  While 
this logic may form the test for individuals’ constitutionally-protected privacy interests, it 
should not be the basis for determining whether privacy legislation directed at contactless 
payment systems is warranted. 
 171. Hearing, supra note 8, at 44 (statement of Cédric Laurant, Policy Counsel, EPIC). 
 172. See generally id. at 35–39 (prepared statement of Barry Steinhardt, Dir. of the 
Tech. and Liberty Program, ACLU). 
 173. Id. at 38 (discussing “proposals to incorporate RFID tags into government identity 
documents”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See generally id. at 34–39. 
SMITH ARTICLE   
2007] GONE IN A BLINK 253 
 
hearing testimony, Cédric Laurant advocated RFID-specific legislation 
to protect individuals’ privacy for “all forms of RFID-based services”176 
but did not articulate specific details on how he would address RFID 
applications other than EPC tags as UPC bar code replacements.  In 
contrast, Paula Bruening urged Congress not to enact legislation 
affecting any RFID application for fear of “technology mandates” that 
would be “ill-suited to the future evolution of the technology,”177 and 
called instead for “baseline privacy legislation” based on “principles of 
fair information practices.”178  The “common elements” of these 
principles suggest that collection of individuals’ personal data “should 
be open and transparent,” that personal data collected “should be 
relevant to . . . [and] used only for the purpose for which it was 
collected,” that it “should be accurate, complete, and timely,” that it 
“should be protected by reasonable security safeguards,” that 
“[i]ndividuals should have a right to view . . . [and] correct” data 
collected about them, and that entities maintaining such data “should be 
accountable for complying with fair information practices.”179 
While Bruening asserted that these principles “provide a starting 
point for all ongoing and future efforts to understand and address the 
RFID privacy issue,”180 Laurant, who had supported Bruening’s position 
on the fair information principles at the subcommittee hearing, later 
called a set of self-regulatory guidelines developed from the same 
principles “inadequate” because “they failed to give consumers 
adequate privacy protection.”181  First, Laurant asserted that these 
principles were inadequate “because they fail[ed] to provide an 
enforcement mechanism” for individuals if and when an entity violated 
one of the principles.182  Second, the principles made “‘suggestions, but 
 
 176. Id. at 48 (statement of Cédric Laurant, Policy Counsel, EPIC).  Laurant advocated 
that the legal framework for RFID privacy legislation could be the same fair information 
principles Bruening discussed.  Id. at 44. 
 177. Id. at 26, 29 (statement of Paula J. Bruening, Staff Counsel, CDT). 
 178. Id. at 26. 
 179. Id. at 27. 
 180. Id. 
 181. RFID:  International Chamber of Commerce Issues Privacy Protection Guidelines 
on Use of RFID, Privacy L. Watch (BNA), at D-11 (Apr. 25, 2005).  Laurant criticized the 
International Chamber of Commerce’s “guidelines designed to quiet privacy concerns 
surrounding the use of Radio Frequency Identification systems, urging businesses to engage 
in self-regulation as a way of earning consumer confidence and preventing the emergence of 
conflicting RFID laws and regulations around the globe,” even though the guidelines 
appeared to be a near point-for-point adoption of the fair information principles Laurant had 
earlier supported.  Id. 
 182. Id. 
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[did not] require anything.’”183  Third, the principles did not “mak[e] 
sure that consumers provide informed and unambiguous consent before 
their information is collected and used.”184 
In addition to the shortcomings Laurant articulated, there are other 
reasons the fair information principles are not sufficient to address 
privacy concerns caused by contactless payment systems.  An 
individual’s ability to voluntarily choose his or her method of payment 
for any transaction, including anonymous cash transactions, must be 
guaranteed, but these principles do not recommend such voluntary 
participation.  Further, information collected and used in connection 
with these principles is not truly “fair” if an individual’s “choice” to use 
contactless payment devices is not always voluntary.  Finally, these 
principles incorrectly assume that all entities or persons who interrogate 
contactless payment devices to collect the stored information will act in 
accordance with the values of openness, transparency, relevance, 
reasonableness, and accountability. 
The European Commission, generally regarded by privacy advocates 
as far ahead of the United States in protecting individuals’ privacy 
rights, set up an Article 29 advisory group to “look into the privacy and 
other fundamental rights implications of RFID technology.”185  The 
advisory group cited as its impetus the fact that “RFID technology is 
taking off in a variety of sectors,” including “Retail Applications.”186  
However, the working group’s only acknowledgment of retail or retail-
related applications is the planned adoption of EPC tags to replace UPC 
bar codes.187  Nowhere did the advisory group identify or discuss the 
possibility that privacy problems could be caused in the financial 
services sector through the widespread distribution and use of 
contactless payment devices, and the data security principles articulated 
by the advisory group188 appear to have been echoed in the fair 
information principles espoused by privacy advocates in the United 
States. 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Data Protection 
Issues Related to RFID Technology, 10107/05/EN WP 105, at 2 (Jan. 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_en.pdf. 
 186. Id. at 3–5. 
 187. Id. at 4, 13. 
 188. See generally id. 
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B.  Contactless Payment Proponents Hide Behind the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act and Self-Regulation Proposals 
Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)189 deals with 
privacy issues and requires, inter alia, the 
clear disclosure by all financial institutions of their privacy policy 
regarding the sharing of non-public personal information with 
both affiliates and third parties[,] . . . a notice to consumers and 
an opportunity to “opt-out” of sharing of non-public personal 
information with nonaffiliated third parties subject to certain 
limited exceptions[, and] . . . the disclosure of a financial 
institution’s privacy policy . . . at the time of establishing a 
customer relationship with a consumer and not less than annually 
during the continuation of such relationship.190 
However, the GLBA provides no meaningful protection for the 
nonpublic personal information of the customers of financial 
institutions, making the GLBA woefully inadequate to address privacy 
concerns caused by contactless payment systems. 
First, the GLBA applies only to financial institutions that collect and 
disclose their customers’ personal financial information and to any 
company that receives such information from a financial institution.191  
Thus, entities or persons who are not financial institutions and who 
collect and disclose either financial or non-financial personal 
information obtained from consumers’ contactless payment devices or 
payment transactions are not required to comply with the GLBA.  For 
example, GEMB issues the Wal-Mart Credit Card and Wal-Mart 
Discover Card, is a financial institution governed by the GLBA, and 
thus must comply with the GLBA.  In contrast, Wal-Mart—not likely a 
“financial institution”—could begin accepting contactless payment 
transactions, then collect, store, and share the nonpublic personal data it 
obtained by interrogating the contactless payment devices of both 
GEMB account holders and all other customers carrying other 
contactless payment devices such as Chase’s blink card or MasterCard’s 
PayPass.  Since Wal-Mart would not likely be considered a financial 
institution under the GLBA, it appears Wal-Mart could collect and 
disclose both financial and non-financial information obtained from all 
 
 189. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 
113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2000)). 
 190. CRA Amendments in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Summary of Provisions, 
http://banking.senate.gov/conf/grmleach.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 191. See Privacy Initiatives, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act:  The Financial Privacy Rule, 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/financial_rule.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
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its customers’ contactless payment devices or payment transactions with 
no requirement to comply with the GLBA. 
Second, the GLBA does not regulate how financial institutions 
protect individuals’ privacy—it only requires that financial institutions 
disclose their privacy policies to their customers and allow customers to 
request that their nonpublic personal information not be shared with 
other companies.  This means each financial institution issuing 
contactless payment devices is free to decide how and to what extent it 
will protect its customers’ privacy, if at all, and is free to share the 
nonpublic personal information of any customers who have not opted-
out of the financial institution’s information sharing scheme with other, 
even non-affiliated, companies. 
Finally, since the GLBA leaves it up to financial institutions to 
establish their own privacy policies, there is no mandate that financial 
institutions permit voluntary participation—for example, financial 
institutions can require consumers to accept a contactless payment 
device in order to obtain an account.  There is, additionally, no 
requirement that financial institutions obtain their customers’ 
affirmative opt-in to financial institutions’ information sharing schemes, 
no minimum required encryption or other data security standards, and 
no limit to the purposes for which financial institutions may interrogate 
their customers’ contactless payment devices, especially when customers 
are not in the process of making payment transactions.  There is also no 
prohibition against a financial institution interrogating the contactless 
payment devices of any non-customer consumers for any purpose. 
Despite the GLBA’s shortcomings, many companies, including those 
currently issuing contactless payment devices to their customers, have 
implemented privacy policies that appear tailored to meet the GLBA’s 
requirements, perhaps as a preemptive move in hopes of avoiding 
additional privacy legislation.192  Among contactless payment device 
issuers, ExxonMobil appears to have strictly followed the GLBA’s 
requirements in its Speedpass privacy policy,193 whereas MasterCard, 
Visa, and Chase merely apply the privacy policies for their regular credit 
and debit card products to their contactless payment programs—privacy 
policies governed specifically by the GLBA.194 
 
 192. See notes 157–160 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Speedpass Consumer Privacy Policy, https://www.speedpass.com/forms/ 
frmPrivacy2.aspx (last visited Dec. 22, 2006). 
 194. Chase does not have a privacy policy tailored specifically to its blink card.  See 
generally Chase Privacy Policy, http://www.chase.com/ccp/index.jsp?pg_name=ccpmapp/ 
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Applied Digital has articulated privacy guidelines for its VeriChip 
that are markedly different from the GLBA’s requirements, but 
Applied Digital has not obligated itself to very much:  VeriChip 
subscribers’ participation “should be voluntary[,] . . . subscribers are 
able to have their VeriChip removed and discontinued at any time,” and 
only subscribers should choose who has access to their nonpublic 
personal information stored in Applied Digital’s databases.195  
Otherwise, Applied Digital offers that its Chief Privacy Officer will stay 
on top of “the day-to-day global evolution of” RFID technology, 
“immediately address” subscribers’ privacy concerns, and “engage 
government, privacy groups, the industry and consumers to assure that 
the adoption of VeriChip and RFID technology is through education 
and unity rather than isolation and division.”196 
Among Applied Digital’s guidelines, voluntary participation and 
discontinuance are most critical to contactless payment systems.  If 
individuals are ever required to use contactless payment devices to do 
business with any bank or merchant, such a condition would eliminate 
the anonymity currently afforded to individuals by virtue of the ability 
to make cash transactions.197  In discussing voluntariness, however, it is 
noteworthy that Applied Digital used words like “should” and “are” 
rather than “must” and “shall,” indicating it may be all too willing to 
cooperate if the federal government ever requires mandatory chipping 
of individuals for secure identification or other purposes. 
Problems with Applied Digital’s other suggestions prevent its 
guidelines from being effective for contactless payment systems.  First, 
Applied Digital’s commitment to have its Chief Privacy Officer stay 
abreast of RFID technology does not guarantee its subscribers’ privacy.  
 
shared/assets/page/Privacy_Policy (last visited Dec. 22, 2006).  MasterCard does not have a 
privacy policy tailored specifically to its PayPass card.  See MasterCard PayPass, 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/aboutourcards/paypass/index.html (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2006) (“Current MasterCard and Issuer privacy and confidentiality rules apply as per 
your current cardholder agreement.”).  Visa does not have a privacy policy tailored 
specifically to its Visa Contactless card.  See Visa USA, Personal:  Visa Contactless, 
http://www.usa.visa.com/personal/cards/contactless/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2006) (“Visa 
Contactless provides you with the same security protection you get with the traditional Visa 
cards, including Zero Liability.”). 
 195. Press Release, VeriChip, Applied Digital Announces Six Point Privacy Statement 
at ID World Congress in Barcelona, Spain (Nov. 22, 2004), available at 
http://www.verichipcorp.com/news/1101103200. 
 196. Id. 
 197. This assumes, of course, that RFID tags are not embedded in currency, an idea 
already considered by the European Union.  Kim Yong-Young, Radio ID Chips May Track 
Banknotes, CNET NEWS.COM, May 22, 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1017-1009155.html. 
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Second, Applied Digital’s commitment to immediately address 
subscribers’ privacy rights in documents related to VeriChip only 
obligates Applied Digital to respond to privacy concerns raised by its 
subscribers—it does not obligate Applied Digital to protect its 
subscribers’ privacy proactively.  Third, allowing subscribers to have 
their VeriChip removed at any time reinforces Applied Digital’s 
commitment to voluntary participation, but it does not strengthen 
privacy protections.  For example, security breaches that result in the 
theft of its subscribers’ nonpublic personal information may be the very 
reason subscribers choose to have their VeriChip removed.  Fourth, 
allowing customers to designate who can access their nonpublic 
personal information could exponentially increase the number of attack 
points from which Applied Digital’s databases could be compromised, 
thus harming rather than protecting its subscribers’ privacy.  Finally, a 
notable omission:  Applied Digital made no commitment to develop a 
means of preventing the VeriChip from responding to unauthorized 
RFID readers.  Without such a security feature, which may not be 
technologically or economically feasible, a VeriChip used as a 
contactless payment device could be susceptible to tracking much like 
any consumer product containing an EPC tag. 
Others have discouraged RFID privacy legislation in the name of 
advancing technology.  In his hearing testimony, Sarma pressed 
Congress to forego RFID privacy legislation in order to realize “the 
many benefits associated with this exciting technology.”198  Sarma 
asserted that a hands-off approach would be appropriate since the 
EPCglobal Network199 had already “adopted guidelines for use by all 
companies engaged in the large-scale deployment of EPC” and that 
“[t]hese guidelines [were] intended to complement the national . . . laws 
and regulations dealing with consumer protection, consumer privacy, 
 
 198. Hearing, supra note 8, at 13 (prepared statement of Sanjay Sarma, Assoc. 
Professor, Mass. Inst. Tech.). 
 199. See id. 
 In 1999, the Uniform Code Council, Inc. . . . joined with Procter & Gamble and 
The Gillette Co. in helping establish the Auto-ID (Automatic Identification) Center 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). . . . The center’s mission was to 
develop RFID for use across the global supply chain. 
 . . . . 
 By November, 2003, enough progress had been made in these efforts to 
create . . . EPCglobal Inc., with the mission of developing the technical standards 
pertaining to [the network in which EPC tags could be used] and driving their 
adoption across industries and across the world. 
Id. at 11. 
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and related issues.”200  Sarma promised that consumers would be given 
clear notice of products bearing EPC tags, would be allowed to disable 
or remove EPC tags from products they purchased, and would get to 
learn about RFID technology and its benefits while having time to get 
comfortable with an EPC logo indicating the presence of an RFID tag, 
and that “[c]ompanies [would] use, maintain, and protect records 
generated through EPC in compliance with all applicable laws.”201 
None of these guidelines address the privacy concerns caused by 
contactless payment systems.  First, even if individuals are given clear 
notice of the presence of a contactless smart chip in their contactless 
payment devices, the only choice individuals have, assuming their 
contactless payment devices are in form factors other than traditional 
credit or debit card plastics, is to return the contactless payment device.  
Individuals would not be able to discard, disable, or remove the 
contactless smart chip and still have a functioning contactless payment 
device.  Second, allowing individuals to learn about the technology 
behind their contactless payment device does nothing to protect 
individuals’ privacy; likewise, merely emblazoning a logo on contactless 
payment devices to allow users to get comfortable with an RFID-
enabled microchip’s presence does nothing to protect individuals’ 
privacy.  In fact, providing lessons on RFID and placing logos on 
devices may do nothing more than raise questions in individuals’ minds 
about just how much privacy they ceded by deciding to accept and use 
contactless payment devices.  Finally, even though banks and merchants 
may agree to protect records generated through the use of contactless 
payment systems, such a commitment does not eliminate security-
related privacy concerns202 and does not address the potential for 
individuals to be profiled or tracked by their contactless payment 
devices since no laws prohibiting such activity exist. 
C.  A Bill to Protect Individual Privacy Without Stifling Technology 
The privacy problems caused by contactless payment systems should 
be addressed now to establish appropriate boundaries for RFID 
technology rather than allowing the boundaries to be set, by default, at 
the outer limits of the technology’s full capacity.  While not intended to 
 
 200. Id. at 12.  It is unclear to which laws Sarma was referring since no privacy laws 
directed at RFID have been enacted.  If Sarma was referring, in part, to the GLBA, this was a 
hollow promise.  See supra notes 189–194. 
 201. Hearing, supra note 8, at 12. 
 202. See supra notes 65–95 and accompanying text. 
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be an exhaustive list, the following principles establish a starting point to 
achieve two critical legislative goals:  (1) give every individual as much 
control as is practicably possible over access to his or her nonpublic 
personal information, and (2) avoid impeding the development of 
contactless payment system technology. 
Accordingly, lawmakers should incorporate the following principles 
in legislation addressing the privacy problems caused by contactless 
payment systems: 
(1) All contactless payment devices manufactured for 
distribution in the United States shall include a minimum of 
128-bit and triple DES encryption; 
(2) All persons who issue contactless payment devices to their 
customers shall encrypt all data stored on or transmitted by 
such contactless payment devices, including each device’s 
EPC; 
(3) All contactless payment devices manufactured for 
distribution in the United States shall be capable of 
interrogation or data transmission only when positioned 
within four inches of an authorized RFID reader; 
(4) All contactless payment devices manufactured for 
distribution in the United States shall be capable of 
interrogation only by RFID readers contained in POS 
terminals at the place of business of persons authorized to 
accept an issuers’ contactless payment devices for payment 
transactions; 
(5) All persons accepting contactless payment transactions and 
all persons offering loyalty or other marketing programs shall 
interrogate customers’ contactless payment devices using only 
authorized RFID readers that encrypt data transmitted to or 
collected from customers’ contactless payment devices with at 
least 128-bit and triple DES encryption; 
(6) Persons accepting contactless payment transactions or 
offering loyalty or other marketing programs shall use only 
authorized RFID readers capable of interrogating customers’ 
contactless payment devices from distances no greater than 
four inches; 
(7) Any individual’s use of a contactless payment device shall be 
voluntary and shall not be compelled by any other person; 
(8) Any individual who chooses not to use a contactless payment 
device for any payment transaction or loyalty or other 
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marketing program transaction shall not be denied service by 
any other person, and shall not be denied the opportunity to 
purchase any good or service by any other person; 
(9) No person shall interrogate or attempt to interrogate any 
individual’s contactless payment device for any purpose other 
than to complete an authorized payment transaction or 
customer-authorized loyalty or other marketing program 
transaction; 
(10) Any person offering loyalty or other marketing programs that 
access and use nonpublic personal information stored on or 
transmitted by any consumer’s contactless payment device 
shall access and use such nonpublic personal information only 
for that person’s internal business purposes; 
(11) No nonpublic personal information collected by a person 
from any individual’s contactless payment device, including 
the device’s EPC, or from any contactless payment device 
transaction shall be shared with any other person, including 
affiliated persons; 
(12) Any person accepting contactless payment transactions, and 
any person offering loyalty or other marketing programs that 
access and use nonpublic personal information stored on or 
transmitted by any customer’s contactless payment device, 
shall clearly notify each customer how his or her nonpublic 
personal information will be accessed and used for that 
person’s internal business purposes before accessing and 
using any such nonpublic personal information; 
(13) Any person offering loyalty or other marketing programs that 
access and use nonpublic personal information stored on or 
transmitted by any customer’s contactless payment device 
shall require customers to opt-in voluntarily to participate in 
such loyalty or other marketing programs; 
(14) Any person offering loyalty or other marketing programs that 
access and use nonpublic personal information stored on or 
transmitted by any customer’s contactless payment device 
shall only interrogate a customer’s contactless payment 
device while the customer is on the premises of the person’s 
business; 
(15) No person accepting authorized payment transactions made 
with contactless payment devices shall permit any affiliated or 
non-affiliated person to place, temporarily or permanently, 
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any RFID reader on its premises for any purpose, including 
accessing and using or attempting to access and use the 
nonpublic personal information stored on or transmitted by 
any individuals’ contactless payment device; 
(16) No person offering loyalty or other marketing programs of 
any kind shall permit any affiliated or non-affiliated person to 
place, temporarily or permanently, any RFID reader on its 
premises for any purpose, including accessing and using or 
attempting to access and use the nonpublic personal 
information stored on or transmitted by any individuals’ 
contactless payment device; 
(17) Any person collecting any individual’s nonpublic personal 
information from any contactless payment device and storing 
such information in any database in any medium shall 
implement strict data security controls:  for example, 
instituting multiple, layered logins plus physical confirmation 
of biometric authenticators to access any data; permitting 
data access only to bonded persons; submitting to audits by 
the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, FTC, or other 
appropriate regulatory agency, at least quarterly, to ensure 
compliance with required data security controls; and 
reporting and repairing data security breaches pursuant to 
any applicable federal and state laws; and 
(18) Any person collecting any individuals’ nonpublic personal 
information from any contactless payment device and storing 
such information in any database in any medium shall destroy 
all such information no later than 120 days after the collection 
of such information. 
CONCLUSION 
Contactless payment devices are an RFID application whose time is 
due, promising greater convenience for consumers and greater 
profitability for banks and merchants.  While rapid, creative advances 
have been made by issuers of contactless payment systems, neither 
privacy advocates nor lawmakers have used the same creative vision to 
recognize the privacy problems caused by contactless payment systems.  
Legislation clearly delineating privacy rights in this area would serve to 
make applications developed for contactless payment systems more 
acceptable to consumers and would speed their widespread adoption.  
The time has come to recognize and discuss privacy problems caused by 
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contactless payment systems and to develop and implement appropriate 
privacy protections. 
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